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ORGANIZED PROFESSIONAL TEAM SPORTS AND
THE ANTITRUST LAWS
Samuel R. Pierce, Jr..*
To what extent, if any, should organized professional team sports'
be exempt from the federal antitrust laws? This problem has received
substantial consideration by the judiciary and Congress, but to date
remains unresolved. An analysis of this perplexing question together
with a proposed solution is the task undertaken in this paper.
1. HISTORY OF THE PROBLEM
The Federal Baseball case,2 decided by the Supreme Court in 1922,
is the genesis of any discussion concerning the application of anti-
trust laws to organized professional team sports. In that case it was
unanimously held' that organized professional baseball was not inter-
state commerce, and therefore was not subject to the federal antitrust
laws. Mr. Justice Holmes, in writing the opinion of the Court, pointed
out that baseball was neither "interstate" nor "commerce." He took the
position that "exhibitions of baseball"' -were "purely state affairs"5
with only incidental effects on interstate commerce, and that as baseball
involved "personal effort, not related to production,"' it was "not a sub-
ject of commerce. '7
After the Federal Baseball case, significant changes took place in the
business of baseball' as well as in the Supreme Court's conception of
t See Contributors' Section, Masthead, p. 659, for biographical data.
* The writer wishes to acknowledge his indebtedness to Dean Eugene V. Rostow of the
Yale Law School for encouragement and constructive criticism. He also desires to express
his gratitude to Messrs. Louis F. Carroll, attorney for the Commissioner of Baseball and the
National League; Herbert N. Maletz, Chief Counsel to the Subcommittee on Antitrust of the
House Committee on the Judiciary; Creighton E. Miller, attorney for the National Football
League Players' Association; and to the law firm of Lewis and Mound, attorneys for the
Major League Baseball Players' Association and the National Hockey League Players' As-
sociation, for making available certain information and materials which were useful in the
preparation of this article. The views expressed in the article, however, are solely those of
the author and should in no way be attributed to any of the persons mentioned.
I The term "organized professional team sports" as used in this article refers to organized
professional baseball, football, hockey and basketball
2 Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball
Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
3 The Federal Baseball case was the only Supreme Court decision dealing with the anti-
trust aspects of professional sports to be unanimous. Cf. Radovich v. National Football
League, 352 U.. 445 (1957); United States v. International Boxing Club of New York,
Inc., 348 US. 236 (1955); Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
4 259 U.S. at 208.
5 Ibid.
6 Id. at 209.
T Ibid.
8 Many have the erroneous impression that the Supreme Court in the Federal Baseball
case held that baseball was a sport and not a business. Professional baseball has always
been considered a business. See 259 US. at 208.
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"interstate commerce." With respect to changed business conditions, two
are particularly noteworthy. First, the "farm system"9 was developed,
whereby major league clubs gained ownership or substantial control over
many minor league teams throughout the country. Second, radio, and
later television, began to broadcast games to every corner of the nation.
Simultaneously with these changes in baseball, the Supreme Court,
in a host of decisions, continued to broaden the constitutional concept
of "interstate commerce." One of these-United States v. South-Eastern
Underwriters Association'-is of special interest since it, in effect,"
overruled Paul v. Virginia3 and Hooper v. California,24 the cases upon
which the Supreme Court relied in deciding the Federal Baseball case.' 5
A brief discussion of the Paul and Hooper cases and of their relationship
to the Federal Baseball decision will highlight the significance of South-
Eastern Underwriters.
Paul and Hooper each involved the question of whether a company
conducting an insurance business in several states was engaged in inter-
9 "When baseball clubs in leagues of lower classification are owned or controlled by a
baseball club of higher classification, normally a major league, they comprise a farm system
or chain."
"Control may be in the form of stock ownership, either in whole or in part, of the club
of lower classification, sufficient to enable the dub of a higher classification to pick and
choose, subject to the major and minor league rules, all or some of the players on the
roster of the club of lower classification. Control, without outright ownership, may be
exercised through working agreements... : H.R. Rep. No. 2002, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 177
(1952).
10 Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948);
Martino v. Michigan Window Cleaning Co., 327 U.S. 173 (1946); Roland Electric Co. v.
Walling, 326 U.S. 657 (1946); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 US. 111 (1942). See also Dowling,
"Constitutional Development in Five War Years," 32 Va. L. Rev. 461, 467-75 (1946);
Neville, "Baseball and the Antitrust Laws," 16 Fordham L. Rev. 208, 216-30 (1947);
Comment, 62 Yale L.J. 576, 608-11 (1953); and Notes, 53 Colum. L. Rev. 242, 247-48
(1953); 5 N.Y.U. Intra. L. Rev. 206, 211-16 (1950); 24 Notre Dame Law. 372, 375-77
(1949). For an interesting analysis of the term "trade or commerce" see Hanmilton and
Adair, The Power to Govern 49-63 (1937).
11 322 US. 533 (1944).
12 The Court in the Underwriters case did not specifically state that it overruled Paul
v. Virginia, but that this was the effect of the decision there can be no doubt. Mr. Justice
Jackson recognized this in his partial dissent. In 322 US. at 587 he said, "Instead of over-
ruling our repeated decisions that insurance is not commerce .. ."; and at 589 he stated,
"But the Court now is not following, it is overruling, a unequivocal line of authority
reaching over many years."
13 74 US. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868).
14 155 US. 648 (1895).
15 In its opinion, the Supreme Court cited Hooper v. California and failed to cite Paul
v. Virginia. However, there can be no question that the Court also relied on the Paul case.
In the first place, the Supreme Court virtually adopted the rationale of the court of appeals.
It considered that the appellate court had gone "to the root of the case," 259 U.S. at 208,
and since that lower court relied on Paul v. Virginia, 269 Fed. 681, 685 (D.C. Cir. 1921)
it can be assumed that the Supreme Court did too. Secondly, the Court used language in
its opinion, namely, "Personal effort, not related to production is not a subject of com-
merce," which was taken verbatim from the defendants' brief. As the defendants cited
the Paul case in support of this statement, it gives further indication that the Supreme
Court relied on that case. Finally, the rationale of the Hooper case is based so completely
on the Paul case that to depend on Hooper required the Court to rely on the Paul case.
See Rep. Att'y Gen. Comm. to Study Antitrust Laws 63 (1955).
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state commerce. The :ourt held in each case that it was not, on the
ground that issuing a policy of insurance was not a transaction of com-
merce." The fact that an insurance business utilized some of the instru-
mentalities of interstate commerce in effecting a policy did not tr'ansform
that business into interstate commerce17 The use of such interstate
commercial arteries was considered purely incidental to the issuance of
an insurance policy. Thus, according to these cases, the business of
insurance was not commerce, but a local activity with incidental effects
on the flow of interstate commerce.
The Holmes opinion in the Federal Baseball case adopted analogous
reasoning. The business of baseball was considered not to be commerce,
but a local activity. The transportation in interstate commerce of play-
ers, and the paraphernalia used by them, was viewed as incidental to the
primary purpose, namely, the production of a 'ball game, and was "not
enough to change the character of the business.1 Said Mr. Justice
Holmes, "[T]he transport is a mere incident, not the essential thing ....
That which in its consummation is not commerce does not become com-
merce among the States because the transportation that we have men-
tioned takes place."19 Consequently, as in the insurance cases, the busi-
ness of baseball was held not to be commerce, though some of its in-
cidents were.
In South-Eastern Underwriters members of an association of insurance
companies were indicted for alleged violation of sections 1 and 2 of the
'1 The Supreme Court in Hooper v. California relied on the same language used in
Paul v. Virginia. In the Hooper case, 155 US. at 654, the Court stated:
Thus in Paul v. Virginia, the court, speaking through Mr. Justice Field, said:
"Issuing a policy of insurance is not a transaction of commerce. The policies are
simple contracts of indemnity against loss by fire, entered into between the corporations
and the assured.... These contracts are not articles of commerce in any proper mean-
ing of the word. They are not subjects of trade and barter, offered in the market as
something having an existence and value independent of the parties to them. They are
not commodities to be shipped or forwarded froir, one State to another, and then put
up for sale. They are like other personal contracts between parties which are com-
pleted by their signature and the transfer of the consideration. Such contracts are not
interstate transactions, though the parties may be domiciled in different States. The
policies do not take effect-are not executed contracts-until delivered by the agent in
Virginia. They are, then, local transactions, and are governed by the local law."
17 The Court in Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. at 655 when faced with the argumenr
that an insurance corporation in effecting a policy used some of the instrumentalities oi
interstate commerce and therefore was engaged in such commerce, said:
It ignores the real distinction upon which the general rule and its exceptions are based,
and which consists in the difference between interstate commerce or an instrumentality
thereof on the one side and the mere incidents which may attend the carrying on of
such commerce on the other....
The business of insurance is not commerce. The contract of insurance iz not an
instrumentality of commerce. The making of such a contract is a mere incident of
commercial intercourse ...
Cf. National League v. Federal Baseball Club, 269 Fed. 681, 685 (D.C. Cir. 1921), aff'd
259 U.S. 200 (1922).
18 259 U.S. at 209.
19 Ibid.
PROFESSIONAL SPORTS
Sherman Act. The defendants contended that as insurance was not
commerce the Act failed to apply to their operations. In reversing an
unbroken line of cases which extended over a period of 75 years, ' the
Supreme Court held the insurance business was interstate commerce and
thus subject to the antitrust laws. The decision completely destroyed
the rationale relied on in the Paul and Hooper cases. The Court con-
ceded that contracts of insurmce were local in nature, but contended
that interstate activities were essential to their negotiation and execu-
tion. As a consequence, there was a chain of inseparable events con-
stituting interstate commerce.21 In the light of this decision, additional
doubtF was raised as to the current validity of the Federal Baseball
ruling since it had leaned so heavily on the earlier insurance cases.23
Against this background, a player named Daniel Gardella brought a
treble damage action against organized baseball in 1948. The Gardella
suit24 was the first since the Federal Baseball case in which organized
professional baseball was accused of violating the antitrust laws. It was
soon followed by Martin v. National League"5 and several other private
antitrust suits, including the well known Toolson case.28
2 0 These cases commenced with Paul v. Virginia in 1868 and ended with United States v.
South-Eastern Underwriters Association in 1944.
21 This approach differed from that used by the Supreme Court in earlier insurance cases
wherein the Court purported to separate and weigh the interstate and local aspects of an
enterprise in order to distinguish the essential from the incidental.
22 The term "additional doubt" is used because other Supreme Court decisions (see note
13 supra) as well as changes in baseball's business practices had also made it questionable
whether the Federal Baseball case was still sound.
23 See Neville, supra note 10 (contended that Federal Baseball Club v. National League
had in effect been overruled). Cf. Eckler, "Baseball-Sport or Commerce?," 17 U. ChL L.
Rev. 56 (1949) (argued that baseball was not commerce). Note how Professor Powell
discussed the impact of the South-Eastern Underwriters case on the Federal Baseball
decision in "Insurance as Commerce in Constitution and Statute," 57 Harv. L. Rev. 937,
960-61 (1944).
24 Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1949), reversing, 79 F. Supp. 260
(S.D.N.Y. 1948).
25 174 F.2d 917 (2d Cir. 1949), affirming, Martin v. Chandler, 85 F. Supp. 131 (S.D.N.Y.
1949).
28 Prendergast v. Syracuse Baseball Club, Inc., No. 3936, N.D.N.Y. April 30, 1951. This
suit involved a pitcher who was blacklisted because he refused to be assigned by Syracuse
to Beaumont at a substantial salary cut. The case was dismissed after the Supreme Court
decided Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953). For a detailed discussion
of the facts surrounding the Prendergast case see Hearings on Organized Professional Team
Sports before the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Committee on the judiciary. 85th
Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 8, pt. I, at 1202-33 (1957).
Tepler v. Frick, 112 F. Supp. 245 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), aff'd, 204 F.2d-506 (1953). In this
case the plaintiff alleged that he injured his arm pitching for Nashville; and contended that
the defendants, through the regulations of organized baseball, had in effect reduced him to
a state of peonage, and were negligent in their care of him. The complaint was dismissed
on the ground that there was no allegation of damage to the plaintiff resulting proximately
from the acts of the defendants which constituted violation of the antitrust laws.
Other cases, the facts of which will be discussed infra, include: Corbett and El Paso
Baseball Club, Inc. v. Chandler, 346 U.S. 356 (1953), affirming, 202 F.2d 428 (6th Cir.
1953); Kowalski v. Chandler, 346 U.S. 356 (1953), affirming, 202 F.2d 413 (6th Cir. 1953);
Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.. 356 (1953), affirming, 200 F.2d 198 (9th Cir.
1952).
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Gardella v. Chandler arose out of the fight for players' services which
organized professional baseball was having with the Mexican League
immediately after World War I.I7 In an effort to halt the exodus of
players from the major leagues, Commissioner A. B. Chandler announced
that any player who "jumped" his contract or his reserve clause would
be blacklisted for five years. 8 Despite the admonition, 18 players, in-
cluding Gardella, left major league clubs to play in Mexico. 9
Danny Gardella played with the New York Giants in 1944 and 1945.
but did not sign a contract with that team for the 1946 season. Instead
Gardella signed with the Mexican League thereby "jumping" the reserve
clause of his contract with the Giants. In line with his warning, Commis-
sioner Chandler blacklisted Gardella and the other players who "jumped'
to Mexico. When Gardella found playing conditions south of the border
not to his liking, he applied to Chandler for reinstatement, but th(
Commissioner denied the application30 Thereafter, Gardella broughl
suit, alleging organized baseball was a monopoly and conspiracy in re
straint of trade in violation of the Sherman and Clayton Acts.3
On the authority of Federal Baseball, the district court dismisstd th(
case for lack of jurisdiction.32 On appeal, by a split decision and in thre,
separate opinions, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reverse(
and remanded the case for trial. Judge Learned Hand joined Judgo
Frank in voting for reversal while Judge Chase registered a dissent.
27 The postwar period . . .brought the first challenge since the Federal League of
1914-15 to organized baseball's monopsony position in the market for baseball players.
In 1946, Don Jorge Pasquel, millionaire president of the Mexican League, an association
not affiliated with organized baseball, sought to employ players from the major leagues
and touched off what is known as "the Mexican League war."
H.R. Rep. 2002, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 77 (1952) (hereinafter cited as House Report).
28 Id. at 77-78. All major league player contracts are identical in form. This is provide
for by Major League Rule 3(a). These contracts provide for the employment of a play(
for one year. However, they also contain a renewal clause wherein the club is given t1.
right to renew the contract on the same terms for the following year, provided only th-
the player's salary may not be reduced by more than 25 per cent. Since the club's rigi
to renew the contract on the same terms is itself one of the terms of the contract, t
renewal clause obviously gives the club a perpetual option on the player's services. Th
clause is commonly referred to as the "reserve clause." It will be discussed in substanti
detail infra under "II. Organization and Practices of Professional Team Sports."
There is a difference between "jumping" a reserve clause and "jumping" a contract. I
the former case it means that the player played with a team outside organized baseb,
without signing a uniform player's contract for the season in question. The latter ca
occurs when a player signs a uniform player's contract for the season involved and subs-
quent thereto plays with a team outside organized baseball. The difference between the
two situations is factually illustrated by the Gardella and Martin cases. Gardella did n,
sign a contract before playing with the Mexican League. See House Report 78-79.
28 House Report 77.
30 Id. at 79.
81 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (1952); 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §1 13-
(1952).
32 Gardella v. Chandler, 79 F. Supp. 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), reversed, 172 F.2d 402 (
Cir. 1949). Notice how reluctant Judge Goddard was to grant the defendant's motih
to dismiss.
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The case on appeal raised two fundamental questions that were con-
sidered in each of the opinions. One was wisether organized professional
baseball was engaged in interstate commerce. The other was, assuming
baseball to be so engaged, whether the antitrust laws applied to the
reserve clause.
Judge Hand's response to the first issue was quite interesting. He
took the position that the connections baseball had with radio and tele-
vision, gave it "interstate features" which were not present when the
Supreme Court decided Federal Baseball Club v. National League.P
The Judge was quick to point out, however, that although baseball's
relationship with broadcasting meant that it was "pro tonto engaged in
interstate commerce,"- it did not automatically follow that such features
of its business subjected baseball as a whole to the antitrust laws. He
stated that, assuming the case went back for trial, it would become
necessary for the plaintiff to prove that all of baseball's interstate activ-
ities, including radio and television, when taken together, would be large
enough to impress upon that business an interstate character.
Judge Frank likewise found that organized baseball was engaged in
interstate commerce. He made it clear that he did not feel bound by the
Federal Baseball case since, in his opinion, the Supreme Court had in
effect overruled that decision, and had left it but "an impotent zombie."-"
The Judge went on, in any event, to distinguish that earlier case on the
basis of the advent of radio and television. He did not, however, agree
with Judge Hand's conclusion that there was need for the plaintiff to
prove that the defendants' interstate activities represented a substantial
portion of their total activities. Judge Frank was satisfied that the
broadcasting features alone were sufficient to bring baseball under the
antitrust laws.
Judge Chase in his dissent contended that baseball was not interstate
commerce. He expressly relied on the Federal Baseball case. Moreover,
he stated that even in 1922 telegraphic reports of baseball games were
transmitted across state lines. He felt that the difference between such
transmissions and present-day broadcasting was a difference of no legal
significance.
The second major issue in the case-the applicability of the antitrust
laws to the reserve clause-can best be discussed by considering the dis-
3 172 F.2d at 407-08.
34 Id. at 408.
35 Therefore, Judge Hand insisted on using the same "inddental-essential" formula that
was employed by Mr. Justice Holmes in Federal Baseball. Compare the approach taken
by the Supreme Court in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters discussed supra.
38 172 F.2d at 409. The ghost still walks, however. See Radovich v. National Football
League, 3S2 U.S. 445 (1957).
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sent first, since the views expressed by Judges Hand and Frank on this
point were, in a sense, an answer to an argument made by Judge Chase.37
It was contended by Judge Chase that as the reserve clause was a device
used by baseball owners to control and regulate the labor of human be-
ings, any controversies with respect to it were problems of labor-manage-
ment relations, not of the antitrust laws. He maintained that the Su-
preme Court had never applied the Sherman Act inless it was of the
opinion that there was some form of restraint upon commercial competi-
tion in the marketing of goods and services in interstate commerce. He
stated that the instant case did not involve such a situation, but instead
concerned the alleged deprivation of the plaintiff's opportunity to
play baseball as a means of earning a livelihood. Judge Chase vehe-
mently argued that the plaintiff's services, or ability to work, were not
subjects of trade or commerce within the antitrust laws, and that Con-
gress in the enactment of these laws never intended to cover restraints
upon employment. 8
To this, Judge Hand crisply replied.
Be that as it may, whatever other conduct the Acts may forbid, they
certainly forbid all restraints of trade which were unlawful at common-
law, and one of the oldest and best established of these is a contract which
unreasonably forbids any one to practice his calling.
Judge Frank expressed the view that although playing baseball in-
volved personal services, he was satisfied, in light of recent Supreme
Court decisions, that such services should be regarded as "trade or com-
merce" as those words are used in.the Sherman Act.
One final observation is made about the Gardella case. It concerns
Judge Frank's opinion. Judge Frank, unlike his colleagues, did not limit
his views to questions of jurisdiction, but discussed the merits of the
case. He sharply criticized the reserve clauseD Naturally these re-
3 In the Gardella case, the opinions were written in a rather unique order. Judge
Chase's opinion explained the facts of the case, then dissented. The majority opinions of
Judges Hand and Frank followed that of Judge Chase. Judge Hand made it very clear
that he was answering an argument raised by Judge Chase; for he stated in 172 F.2d at 408:
As I understand my brother Chase, he thinks that even though the defendants' business
be in general subject to the Antitrust Acts, the "reserve clause" is not in violation
of them.
38 Id. at 405-06. A N.Y. Supreme Court opinion took the view that even if a monopoly,
organized baseball is not illegal under the N.Y. State antitrust law or at common law.
American League Baseball Club of New York, Inc. v. Pasquel, 187 Misc. 230, 234, 63
N.Y.S.2d 537, 540 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1946).
09)172 F.2d at 408.
4bId. at 412.
,For instance, Judge Frank stated that the reserve clause resulted "in something re-
sem oling peonage of the baseball player" (id. at 409), and argued that "if players be
regarded as quasi-peons, it is of no moment that they are well paid; only the totalitarian-
minded will believe that high pay excuses virtual slavery" (id. at 410).. To the defendants'
argument that baseball would no longer be able to supply millions of Americans with
enjoyment if the reserve clause should be declared illegal, Judge Frank curtly replied, "no
[Vol. 43
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marks must be considered as dicta, but they may significantly influence
future decisions of courts called upon to rule on the reserve clause."
The defendants' motion to dismiss in Martin v. National League,"
the other treble damage action involving players who had "jumped" to
the Mexican League, likewise failed to impress the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit; and that case also was remanded for trial. However,
both the Gardelia and Martin cases were settled before they reached
trial."4 Notwithstanding settlement of these two cases, an imposing array
of litigation against organized professional baseball remained 5 At this
point, moreover, the appellate decisions in the second circuit seemed to
forecast a very gloomy future indeed for the defendants in the pending
treble damage suits.
The threat posed to organized baseball by the litigation instituted in
the late '40's and early '50's prompted "friends of baseball'4 6 in Congress
to introduce bills designed to exempt completely baseball and other pro-
fessional sports from the antitrust laws.' 7 These bills formed the basis
of the congressional hearings on organized baseball held in 1951.5 After
holding these hearings, the House Subcommittee on Study of Monopoly
Power recommended that no legislative action be taken." The sub-
committee took the position that legislation was not necessary until the
reserve clause and other practices of organized baseball questioned by
the impending litigation were ruled on by the courtsP Congress adhered
to the recommendation of the subcommittee, and the bills introduced in
the Eighty-second Congress were never enacted. In sum, Congress
court should strive ingeniously to legalize a private (even if benevolent) dictatorship"
(id. at 415).
42 The reserve clause and the methods used to enforce it are common to all organized
professional team sports. Therefore, the significance of Judge Frank's remarks cannot be
limited to the reserve clause in professional baseball.
43 See note 25 supra.
44 House Report 84. See also Note, S N.Y.U. Intra. L. Rev. 206 (19S0).
45 See note 26 supra.
48 House Report 1.
47 There were four bills introduced, three in the House and one in the Senate. H.R. 4229,
H.R. 4230, H.R. 4231, all introduced in the 1st session of the 82d Congress (1951), were
identical. They provided:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, that the Act of July 2, 1890, as amended, known as the
Sherman Act; the Act of October 15, 1914, as amended, known as the Clayton Act;
the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended; and the Act of June 19, 1936, known
as the Robinson-Patman Antidiscrimination Act shall not apply to organized profes-
sional sports enterprises or to acts in the conduct of such enterprises.
The Senate bill, introduced in the same session of Coagress, was the same as the three
House bills except it did not mention the Robinson-Patman Act. See S. 1526, 82d Cong.,
1st Sem. (1951).
4s Hearings before Subcommittee on Study of Monopoly Power of the House Committee
on the Judiciary, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 1, pt. 6 (1951). Hereafter cited as Baseball
Hearings.49 House Report 232.
50 Id. at 231.
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passed back to the judiciary the problem of the extent to which profes-
sional sports should be exempt from the antitrust laws.
In 1953, approximately a year after Congress had decided to take no
action, Toolson v. New York Yankees," along with Kowalski v. Chand-
r 52 and Corbett v. Commissioner of Baseballn were simultaneously
considered by the Supreme Court. It was the first time since the Federal
Baseball case that the question of the application of the antitrust laws
to professional sports had come before the Supreme Court. The Court
in affirming the sixth and ninth circuit courts of appeals dismissed each
complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
In a concise per curiam opinion the Supreme Court laid any blame for
their action at the doorstep of Congress. After pointing out that Federal
Baseball Club v. National League had exempted baseball from the scope
of the federal antitrust laws, the opinion went on to say:"
Congress has had the ruling [the Federal Baseball decision] under con-
sideration but has not seen fit to bring such business under these laws by
legislation having prospective effect. The business has thus been left for
thirty years to develop, on the understanding that it was not subject to
existing antitrust legislation. The present cases ask us to overrule the prior
decision and, with restrospective effect, hold the legislation applicable. We
think that if there are evils in this field which now warrant application to
it of the antitrust laws it should be by legislation.
Within a few days after the Supreme Court rendered the Toolson deci-
sion, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania decided United States v. National Football League, the onl.,
antitrust case the Department of Justice has ever brought against a pro
51 346 US. 356 (1953). Toolson was blacklisted for refusing to accept assignment fron
Newark to Binghamton. He brought suit alleging defendants had combined to monopoliz,
baseball, and by blacklisting him, they prevented him from earning a living. The defendants
motion for dismissal was granted in the district court, 101 F. Supp. 93 (S.D. Cal. 1951)
aff'd, 200 F.2d 198 (9th Cir. 19S2).
52 346 U.S. 356 (1953). Kowalski was a minor league player who contended that th
defendants, through their monopolization of baseball, used draft restrictions and the reser%
clause to deprive him of the reasonable value of his services and to prevent his promotior
The trial history paralleled that of the Toolson case. The district court dismissed for Iac
of jurisdiction, No. 2646, S.D. Ohio, Jan. 25, 1952, aff'd, 202 F.2d 413 (6th Cir. 1953).
53 346 U.S. 356 (1953). Corbett owned the El Paso Baseball Club in the Arizona-Te_.-
League. He contracted for the 1949 services of several players who bad played in tl
Mexican League in 1948. As organized baseball in the United States at that time bad
reciprocal arrangement with the Mexican League whereby each agreed to respect ti-
reservation claims of the other, the President of the National Association (top administrati'
official of the minor leagues) awarded the players in question to the Mexican Leagu
Corbett sued alleging that the defendants' monopolization of baseball was based on tV
reserve clause which had prevented the plaintiff from obtaining the services of the b:
players in question and deprived him of the opportunity to sell their contracts. Just as
Toolson and KowaLskI, the district court dismissed on jurisdictional grounds, No. 25&
S.D. Ohio, Jan. 2S, 1952, affd, 202 F,2d 428 (6th Cir. 1953).
54 346 US. at 357.
55 116 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa. 1953). This case was decided on Nov. 12, 1953 and t
Supreme Court decided the Toolson case on Nov. 9, 1953.
[Vol 43
PROFESSIONAL SPORTS
fessional team sport.56 The suit, however, was not a direct frontal at-
tack on the business of professional football, but a collateral one, in-
volving the by-laws of the National Football League with respect to
radio and television broadcasting.
Article X of the by-laws of the National Football League provided
that no club could allow a game in which it was engaged to be broad-
casted by radio or television within 75 miles of another League city on
the day that the home club of the other city was either playing at home
or was playing away from home and broadcasting its game into its home
city. An exception to the rule was provided where the outside club ob-
tained permission for such broadcast from the home club. As most
League games were played on Sundays, and since the teams, when not
playing at home, usually broadcasted their "away games" into their
home territories, the restrictions of Article X effectively prevented broad-
casts of practically all outside games in all the home territories. The
government sought to enjoin the enforcement of the provisions of Article
X, contending they were illegal under section 1 of the Sherman Act. The
court granted the government a modified injunction.
Judge Grim's opinion was most interesting indeed. He disposed of
the defendant's jurisdictional arguments on the ground that as radio
and television were clearly interstate commerce, it was immaterial
whether professional football was or not. With respect to the merits,
Judge Grim was guided by the "rule of reason" rather than by the
principle, urged upon him by government counsel, that the allocation of
territories or markets was illegal per se.57
Judge Grim recognized football as a unicjue business. He pointed out
that the members of a professional league could not afford to compete
too well against each other "in a business way"; for if they did, "the
stronger teams would be likely to drive the weaker ones into financial
failure," ultimately destroying the entire league since there would not be
a sufficient number of teams to operate the league profitably." He went
on to decide that it was reasonable for a league to prohibit telecasts of
a team's games into the home territory of another team while the latter
56 Only two other antitrust cases have ever been filed by the Department of Justice
against professional sports: United States v. National Wrestling A1lance, Civil Action No.
3-729 (SD. Iowa 1956); United States v. International Boxing Club of New York, Inc.,
348 U.S. 236 (19S5). The wrestling case was terminated by a contemporaneous consent
decree. The boxing case will be discussed Infra.
57 In 116 F. Supp. at 322 Judge Grim stated:
An allocation of marketing territories for the purpose of restricting competition, how-
ever, Is not always illegal. There Is no simple formula "to displace the rule of reason
by which breaches of the Sherman Law are determined. Nor Is 'division of territory'
so self-operating a category of Sherman Law violations as to dispense with analysis
of the practical consequences of what on paper Is a geographic division of territory."
58 Id. at 323.
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was playing there. The theory for allowing this restriction was that such
telecasts would adversely affect gate receipts and require home team,
to suffer serious financial loss.5 '
On the other hand, he held that the provisions of Article X which
prohibited telecasts into a team's home territory while that team wa.
not playing there were unreasonable because such telecasts would not
have any substantial effect on gate receipts. For the same reason he
struck down all prohibitions on radio broadcasting. ®
In 1955 the problem of the application of the antitrust laws to pro-
fessional sports once again faced the Supreme Court. This time it did
not concern a team sport, but an individual sport, namely, boxing. Th(
Department of Justice had brought a civil antitrust action against the
International Boxing Club and several others81 alleging the defendants
in violation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, had restrained and
monopolized trade and commerce through a conspiracy to exclude corn-
petition in the boxing business. The defendants, in the light of the
Toolson decision, had moved successfully for dismissal in the district
court, and on appeal" urged the Supreme Court to extend to them the
protective umbrella of the Federal Baseball and Toolson rulings.
The Supreme Court, in reversing the lower tribunal, held that "tht
promotion of professional championship boxing contests on a multi-statt
basis, coupled with the sale of rights to televise, br...dcast, and film th(
contests for interstate transmission" constituted inter3tate "trade or corn
merce" within the meaning of the Sherman Act.u Moreover, in th,
course of its opinion, the Supreme Court made it clear that other in
dividual professional sports could not rely on the Federal Baseball cast
and the Toolson case for exemption from the antitrust laws. =
59 Id. at 32S the court said:
The greatest part of the defendant dubs' income is derived from the sale of tickets
to games. Reasonable protection of home game attendance is essential to the very
existence of the individual dubs, without which there can be no League and no pro-
fessional football as we know it today.
60 It is interesting to note that the Department of Justice did not appeal this ca.
Perhaps the Department feared that such an appeal might result in the Supreme Cour
modifying or changing the doctrine that conspiracies or combinations to divide or alloca:
territories or markets are per se illegal.
61 United States v. International Boxing Club of New York, Inc., 348 US. 236 (1935
62 See id. at 237-38, and 238 n.3.
63 In civil actions under the Sherman Act where the United States is the plaintiff, appen
must be taken directly to the Supreme Court. 32 Stat. 823 (1903), 15 US.C. 1 29 (1932
81 348 US. at 240. Thus the case was remanded to the district court where the d,
fendants were held to have violated § 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. See Unitk
States v. International Boxing Club of New York, Inc, 10 F. Supp. 397 (S.D.N.Y. 1957
e5 348 US. at 241-42. The defendants argued that Federal Baseball and Toolson in
munized businesses which involved "exhibitions of an athletic nature." The Court retorte
that those cases were not "authority for exempting other businesses merely because of t
circumstance that they are also based on the performance of local exhibitions." As "loc
exhibition" Is the only thing individual professional sports have In common with the bus
ness of baseball, as that business was Interpreted by the Federal Baseball case, It Is de
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Although a federal district court has held that professional basketball
was subject to the antitrust laws," the Supreme Court did not rule upon
the question of whether professional team sports other than baseball
were subject to the antitrust laws until it reviewed Radovich v. National
Football League in 1957." The Radovich case was a by-product of the
"war" between the National Football League and the All-America Con-
ference which took place in the late '40's." Radovich played with the
Detroit Lions, a National League club, in 1945. He requested the Lions
in 1946 to transfer him to a National League club in Los Angeles be-
cause of his father's illness. When the Detroit team refused, he signed
with the Los Angeles Dons, a niember of the rival All-America Con-
ference, and played with them for two seasons. Then, in 1948, Radovich
was offered employment as a player-coach with the San Francisco Clip-
pers, a member of the Pacific Coast League which was affiated with the
National Football League. According to Radovich, he was prevented
from taking this job because the National League advised the Clippers
that he had been blacklisted, and if any club hired him, it would be
severely penalized.& " On that basis he brought suit against the National
League,70 and the defendant's motion to dismiss eventually came before
the Supreme Court for decision.
In reversing the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and re-
manding the case for trial, the Supreme Court held that professional
football did not gain jurisdictional immunity by way of the Federal
Baseball and Toolson cases. The Court espoused a very narrow applica-
tion of the rule of stare decisis, and, in effect, said that those decisions
were limited solely to organized professional baseball. As the or-
that neither that decision nor the Toolson ruling can be relied on by any individual pro-
fessional sport for exemption from the antitrust laws. The same rationale, however, would
not apply to professional team sports since they have always had many things in common
with baseball, such as the reserve clause, the need for competitors to act jointly, etc. See
discussion infra under "I Organization and Practices of Professional Team Sports."
68 Washington Professional Basketball Corp. v. National Basketball Ass'n, 147 F. Supp.
154 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
87 352 U.S. 445 (1957). See Note, 57 Colum. L. Rev. 72S (1957).
"352 U.S. at 448-49. "The Conference operated from 1946 through 1949 at which time It
was disbanded." Id. at 448 n.4.
69 The alleged facts in the Radovich case are strikingly similar to those in the Gardella
case. See p. 570 supra.
70 Suit was brought under 1 4 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), IS U.S.C. I IS
(1952) alleging the defendants had violated if 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209
(1890), 15 U.S.C. §1 1, 2 (1952).
71 Radovich v. National Football League, 231 F.2d 620 (9th Cir. 1956), revd, 3S2 U.S.
445 (1957). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in the Toolson case (note 51 supra) had
held that baseball was exempted from the antitrust laws, and was affrmed by the Supreme
Court. Here, the Ninth Circuit took tho view that Federal Baseball and Toolson applied
to all "team sports," and therefore, footAl was Immune from the antitrust laws. See 352
U.S. at 447.
•2Justices Harlan and Brennan In their dissent pointed out that they were unable to
distinguish football from baseball under the rationale of Federal Baseball and Toolson, and
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ganization and methods of operation of professional football were so akir.
to those of professional baseball, the Court realized that its ruling migh,
be considered "unrealistic, inconsistent, or ilogical,,)ra but contendec
that any error or discrimination resulting from the Court's strict in
terpretation of the Federal Baseball and Toolson cases should be elimin-
ated by legislation and not by court decision. The Court, speaking
through Mr. Justice Clark, put it this way:7 4
Congressional processes are more accommodative, affording the whole
industry hearings and an opportunity to assist in the formulation of new
legislation. The resulting product is therefore more likely to protect the
industry and the public alike. The whole scope of congressional action
would be known long in advance and effective dates for the legislation
could be set in the future without the injustices of retroactivity and sur-
prise which might follow court action.m
In essence, the Supreme Court requested Congress to handle the prob
lem of the extent to which professional team sports should be exemp,
from antitrust laws. In response to the Supreme Court, seven bills wer
introduced in Congress.7e They fell into three general categories. On
bill provided for the complete exemption of professional team sport-
from the antitrust laws.7 Two others placed organized professiona
baseball under the antitrust laws which, in the light of the Supremt
Court decisions, meant that all professional sports would be covered i"
either of these bills should be enacted.7s The remaining four followed :
middle-of-the-road approach.' These bills, if enacted, would make pro
fessional team sports subject to the antitrust laws, but would specificall.
exempt from those laws certain practices considered essential to thk
successful operation of these sports.r The seven bills formed the basi-
could "find no basis for attributing to Congress a purpose to put baseball in a class b
itself." Therefore, they "would adhere to the rule of stare decisis and affirm the judgmen
below." Id. at 4S6.
13 Id. at 452.
74 Ibid.
75 Radovich settled his case against the National Football League on April 1S, 1958. Se-
N.Y. Times, Apr. 16, 1958, p. 42c, coL 8.
7 H.R. 5307, H.R. 5319, HR. 33, HR. 6876, HR. 6877, H.R. 8023, and H.R. 81
were introduced by members of the House of Representatives In the 1st session of the 8St
Congress. No bills were introduced by the Senate. Copies of the bills introduced appear J
Hearings before the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judia
85th Cong., Ist Sess. ser. 8, pt. 1, at 3-S (1957). Hereafter cited as Hearings on Team Sport-
7 H.L. 5383.
7s H.R. 5307 and HR. S319.
79 H.R. 6876, H.R. 6877, H.R. 8023 and H.R. 8124.
80 H.R. 6876 and HR. 6877 would exempt playing rules of the game; organization c
leagues and associations; territorial agreements; and employment of players. The bills al,
contain language guaranteeing players the right to bargain collectively and to engage in an
"other concerted activities for their mutual aid or protection." H.R. 8023 ai 1 HR. 81:
are exactly the same as these other two bills except HR. 8023 provides for a modi&z
reserve clause, and H.R. 8124 exempts the "selection" as well as the "employment" ,
players In order to make sure draft procedures used in professional football and basketba
ame protected from the antitrust laws.
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for the hearings on organized professional team sports held during the
summer of 1957 by the House Subcommittee on Antitrust.
In October 1957, shortly after the congressional hearings had come
to a dose, the National Hockey League Players' Association brought
a treble damage action against various individuals and teams engaged
in the business of professional hockey.81 This marked the first time that
an antitrust suit had ever been filed against organized professional
hockey. The complaint alleged that the defendants have "monopolized
and obtained complete domination" 82 over the professional hockey busi-
ness, including the terms and conditions of players' employment, with the
result that players have been deprived of their right to negotiate with
various competing bidders to obtain full and fair compensation for their
services. The players have thereby claimed damages to the sum of one
million dollars.a
On January 30, 1958, the House Antitrust Subcommittee recommended
a bill to the Judiciary Committee." The bill provides that the antitrust
laws shall apply to professional baseball, basketball, football and hockey,
but specifically exempts from those laws any
activity among teams or groups of teams engaged in these organized pro-
fessional team sports which is reasonably necessary to-(1) equalization
of competitive playing strengths; (2) the right to operate within specific
geographic areas; or (3) the preservation of public confidence in the hon-
esty in sports contests.as
The bill is designed to exempt from the antitrust laws those sports ac-
tivities reasonably necessary for the preservation of these games. Its
major problem is lack of definiteness. Just what is reasonable? Ob-
viously, it will take a great deal of litigation to find out. The bill has
already received some acute criticism, and there is some doubt as to
whether it will be passed.6
81 National Hockey Leaue Players' Association v. Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n,
Civil Action No. 125-275, S.D.N.Y.
The National Football League Players Association threatened to bring a similar antitrust
suit against the National Football League. However, the Association settled their differences
with the League and the action was never commenced. This information is based on a
letter dated Dec. 11, 1957 sent to me by Creighton . Miller, counsel for the National
Football Players' Association, and is on file in the Yale Law School Library. See also New
York Daily News, Nov. 22, 1957, p. C20, col. 1; Dec. 4,1957, p. C20, coL 2.
82 Par. 6 of the complaint in National Hockey League Players' Association v. Boston
Professional Hockey Ass'n, supra note 81.
83 The one million dollars will be trebled in event of judgment for the plaintif The
plaintif have moved for summary judgment, but the motion had not been argued at the
time of this writing.
04 HR. 10378, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (19S8). The Judiciary Committee is the parent
committee of the House Antitrust Subcommittee. H.R. 10378 was approved by the
Judiciary Committee on May 13, 1958. However, the vote was an extremely close one.
See N.Y. Daily News, May 14, 1958, p. C27, col. 1, and May 15, 1958, p. 80 el. 2.
38 Emphasis added. HR. 10378, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
s See Holeman, Okay Reserve Clause Aid Bill, N.Y. Daily News, Jan. 31, 1958, p. C20,
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In summary, then, with the exception of baseball, all professional
team sports have been held subject to the antitrust lawsOs However, the
exact nature and extent to which the organization and practices of these
sports will be affected by the application of the antitrust laws is as yet
unknown."8 The Supreme Court has urged Congress to work out the
problem of what exemptions, if any, should be granted to professional
team sports.89 The House Antitrust Subcommittee has held hearings on
the subject and has reported out a bill, but the actual enactment of
legislation appears to be some time off. 1
II. ORGANIZATION AND PRACTICES OF PROFESSIONAL TEAM SPORTS
Athletic competition is the life-blood of professional team sports.
Without a substantial amount of it, spectator interest would soon wane,
and the financial difficulties which would follow would lead to serious
deterioration, if not to the complete elimination, of these sports as they
are known today. Professional team sports have promulgated elaborate
rules and regulations which govern their activities. Spokesmen for these
sports have said that such rules and regulations are absolutely necessary
to promote and maintain competition between teams on the playing
field.' Naturally, in order to make and execute these "laws," the several
clubs in each league must cooperate as partners. Thus, it is argued that
the business of professional team sports is unique in that no other in-
dustry requires its competitors to cooperate as partners; as this co-
operation and combination have raised. the question of Sherman Act
violation, team sports should be granted exemption from the antitrust
laws 3
On the other hand, some critics have vehemently argued that athletic
and economic ruin would not follow the application of the antitrust laws
col. 3; N.Y. Herald Tribune, Jan. 31, 1958, § 3, p. 1, col. 3 and p. 10, col. 7. See
news report on bill introduced by Rep. Rogers in N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1958, p. 35, coL 4.
S Individual sports, of course, are subject to the antitrust laws. See note 65 supra.
88 Compare the approach taken by Judge Grim in United States v. National Football
League, 116 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa. 1953), with that taken by Judge Frank in Gardella
v. Chandler, 172 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1949).
89 Radovich v. National Football League, 352 US. 445, 452 (1957).
90 The House Antitrust Subcommittee (formerly Subcommittee on Study of Monopoly
Power) held hearings on baseball in 1951 and on team sports in 1957.
91 The bill reported out by the House Antitrust Subcommittee must be approved by a
majority of the House Judiciary Committee, and must be voted on by the House. If the
House passes it, the bill must go through a similar procedure in the Senate. If there are
differences between the two Houses as to the nature of the legislation, they must be Ironed
out in joint committee sesslow before legislation can be enacted.
92 See, eg., statements of baseball's Commissioner Frick, and footballs Commissioner
Bell n Hearings on Team Sports, pt. 1, at 166, and pt. 3, at 2724-45.
93 See Hearings on Team Sports, pt. 1, at 164-72 (Baseball's Commissioner Fritk); pt.
3, at 2734 (Football's Commissioner Bell); at 2894-95 (Basketball's President Podoloff);
and at 2986 (Hockey's President Campbell). These spokesmen would like to have team




to professional team spcrts." They contend that the principal effect of
these self-regulating systems has been to guarantee organized profes-
sional baseball, basketball, football and hockey virtual control over two
markets: the market for purchasing players' services, and the market
for selling exhibitions of professional team sports to the public 9 They
argue that due to the monopolistic and monopsonistic positions held by
these sports, as organized today, it is practically impossible for anyone
to gain entry to these businesses without becoming a part of the existing
organizations?" Moreover, it is said these organizations have cooperated
to control effectively the price of players' services.
The pros and cons outlined above clearly indicate that a decision as
to whether any e:-emption should be allowed is dependent upon a basic
understanding of the organization and practices of these sports. The
ensuing discussion will undertake, among other things, to describe the
organizational structures of these sports, to emphasize those practices
which have antitrust implications, and to point out the arguments for
and against each of these practices.
Baseball
The Government of Organized Professional Baseball extends from the
Arctic Circle to the Equator. It consists of 29 leagues, made up of 210
clubs, representing 212 cities in Canada, Cuba, Mexico and the United
States. 7 At the top of the hierarchy are the two major leagues, and the
remaining leagues compose the minor leagues?
The clubs are governed by several important documents. Each league
has its own constitution and by-laws." The Major League Agreement
and Major League Rules bind the two major leagues together and
regulate the conduct of their players and team owners. The National
Association Agreement governs the minor leagues. The Major League-
National Association Rules are designed to cover matters the two cate-
gories of leagues have in:common, such as working agreements between
major and minor league teams, "bonus player" rules, and major league
selection of minor league players. Finally, the Professional Baseball
Agreement further defines the inter-relationship between the major and
94 ER.g, Topkis, Monopoly in Professional Sports" S8 Yale LJ. 691 (1949).
95 Cf. Comment, 62 Yale LJ. 576 (1953) ; House Report 77, 228.
96 What happened In football and baseball tends to prove the correctness of this state-
ment. See text supra at notes 27 and 67. The history of baseball also provides other
examples. See House Report 27-29 (the Union Assn War); 33-36 (the Players League
War); and 5o-9 (the Federal League War).
97 The Baseball Blue Book 12 (1957).
9s The minor leagues are divided Into classes based primarily on the talent of the players
In each league. At the top of the cassificatlon scale are the Open Class and Class AAA,
followed by Classes AA, A-I, A, B, C, and D.
99 See Hearings on Team Sports, pt. 1, 391-1183, and pt. 2, 1394-1404; 1417-8.
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minor leagues.100 These constitutions and agreements are administered
primarily by the Commissioner of Baseball, the President of the National
Association, and the presidents of the various leagues.2°1
The Commissioner of Baseball is the titular head of organized base-
ball. He is selected by the major league club owners, and his powers and
functions, as defined by the agreements previously referred to, extend
to both major and minor league matters. He is assisted in his adminis-
trative duties by an Executive Council, which consists of the president
of each major league, and two major league club owners, one elected by
each league. However, on all matters concerning the uniform players'
contract, players are represented on the Council by an active player,
chosen by his fellow players, from each ma.or league. 1
The President of the National Association is selected by the minor
league club owners. He is regarded as the chief executive officer of the
minor leagues. However, he does not operate completely independent of
the Commissioner's office. Many of his decisions are subject to final
approval by the Commissioner. He is aided by an Executive Committee
which consists of three minor league club owners elected by the other
members of the Association.1P
The remaining group of significant administrators in the government
of organized baseball are league presidents. Each, of course, is chosen by
the members of his particular league. The scope of his authority is de-
fined in the constitution and by-laws of the league. 101
Aside from prescribing the powers and functions of those who adminis-
ter them, the rules and regulations of organized baseball govern a myriad
of practices. Several have serious antitrust implications. Foremost
among these is the "reserve clause."
Every player in organized baseball is subject to the reserve clause.
Although the uniform players' contract for major league players differs,
in certain particulars, from the one for minor league players, the reserve
clause in each has the same effect. 0 5 These contracts are for one year.
Each gives the club the option to renew, on substantially the same
100 The agreements which govern organized baseball appear on pages 500-809 of The
Baseball Blue Book (1957).
201 For further consideration of the functions and powers of these officials see Hearings
on Team Sports, pt. 1, at 91-114; 122-72; 174-82; 182-217; pt. 2, 1343-53; 1358-77.
102 See Major League Agreement, Artides I and II.
103 See National Association Agreement, Articles Three, Four and Six.
104 Eg., Art. Five, § 5.3 of the National League Constitution. See also note 99 supra.
105 As would be expected the uniform contract for the major leagues is more beneficial
to the player than the one for the minor leagues. Compare the minor league contract set
forth in Hearings on Team Sports, pt. 1, at 382 with the major league contract in same
Hearings, pt. 2, at 1491. For further discussion on the differences between the two contracts,
see House Report 112-27.
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terms,e for the following year. As this right to renew is itself a term
of the contracts, the renewal clause obviously results in giving the club
a perpetual option on players' services.
However, the term "reserve clause" implies more than the option
to renew. It carries with it the connotation that if a player violates the
clause in any way, organized baseball may impose certain sanctions
against the player, such as blacklisting him. Organized baseball justifies
its authority for penalizing a reserve clause violator in this way: Every
player's contract, of which the reserve clause is a part, provides that
the player signing it must agree to accept and comply with all provi-
sions of the constitutions and agreements of organized baseball which
concern player conduct and player-club relationships, and with all the
decisions of baseball executives made pursuant thereto.107 Thus, the
rules and regulations to which the player agrees to be bound include
the means of penalizing him for violating the reserve clause.' °
At this point the question may logically be raised as to why organized
baseball does not rely on the courts to enforce breaches of the reserve
clause. To answer that question one must first understand the remedy
a club seeks when it considers that a player has violated the reserve
clause. The club is not interested in money damages, 19 but in requiring
the player to perform his contract or preventing him from working else-
where. Thus, the club wants an equitable rather than a legal remedy. It
is basic that the policy against involuntary servitude prevents a court of
equity from forcing a person to work against his will, and makes it
reluctant to restrain an employee from working elsewhere. However, in
the case of an employee whose talents are unique, courts may enjoin that
employee from working for a competitor of his employers on the basis
of the doctrine first enunciated in the case of Lumley v. Wagner.P0
Many clubs have brought suits against alleged reserve clause violators
on the basis of the Lumley v. Wagner doctrine. However, on the whole,
106 In major league contracts the club can renew for the same terms except that the
player's salary may not be reduced more than 25 per cent. In minor league contracts, if the
parties fail to agree on compensation at the time of renewal, the dispute is arbitrated by
the Executive Committee or the President of the National Association.
107 Major League Uniform Player's Contract, Clause 9(a); Minor League Uniform
Player's Contract, Clause 9.
108 Although there are a number of rules and regulations which relate to the reserve
status of a ball player, the ones dealing most specifically with sanctions imposed for reserve
clause or contract "jumping" are Rules 15 and 16 of the Major League Rules and Rules
15 and 16 of the Major League-National Association Rules. For a detailed historical
analysis of the "reserve clause' see House Report 22-26, 46, 111-77.
109 Moreover, damages may be too speculative for the club to prove. See Note, 32 Va.
L. Rev. 1164, 1172 (1946).
110 1 De G. M. & G. 604, 42 Eng. Rep. 687 (Ch. 1852). Miss Wagner, the famous opera
singer, was enjoined from performing for a competitor of her employer on the ground that
her talent was so unique as to make her irreplaceable. The Lumley doctrine was first
brought into American law by McCaull v. Braham, 16 Fed. 37 (C.C.SD.N.Y. 1883).
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these clubs have been unsuccessful 11 As a result, organized baseball
does not depend on the courts for enforcement, but relies on its own
sanctions.
Baseball has surrounded the reserve clause with certain safeguards to
prevent its abuse. Without these, the reserve clause would certainly be
most unfair to players, and would have some harmful effects on owners.
For instance, if there were no safeguards, a wealthy owner could pur-
chase a vast number of players and keep them on his roster even though
he played relatively few of them. The purpose of such a maneuver
would be to bar his competitors from playing talent. The effect would be
injurious to both players and owners. Many players would be denied the
opportunity to play. At the same time they would be deprived of the
right to have any other clubs bid for their services. Moreover, the
club owner could exercise unlimited discretion in cutting the salaries of
the players he had under contract. Other club owners would suffer from
such an arrangement because they would be completely excluded from
a substantial source of unused playing talent.
Examples of how a completely unrestricted reserve clause might oper-
ate to the detriment of players and owners could be multiplied. How-
ever, the one stated suffices to illustrate the point. The principal safe-
guards adopted by organized baseball to prevent such inequities include
the player draft, waiver rule, minimum salary requirement, salary ar-
bitration, and player limit.
Although the draft is of benefit to club owners in that it helps to main-
tain an open supply of players for the collective good of all clubs, its
basic purpose is to provide a player with a reasonable opportunity to
advance from a lower classified league to the highest classification that
his skills merit. The rule gives a club of higher classification the right
to select at the end of the season the contract of a player in a lower
classification.=-
The major leagues have the first choice in the selection system. Each
team is entitled to pick one eligible player 3 from a minor league club.
Choices are made in reverse order of standings of the clubs in each
111 Occasionally clubs have been successful in these suits. Perhaps the most famous
example is the case of Philadelphia Ball Club v. La Joie, 202 Pa. 210, 51 At!. 973 (1902).
In most cases, however, for a variety of different reasons, the courts failed to grant the
plaintiff relief. One of the most common reasons for refusing to enforce the reserve clause
was lack of mutuality. For a detailed discussion of suits brought to enforce the reserve
clause see Johnson, "Baseball and the Law," 73 U.S.L. Rev. 252 (1939). See also Notes,
46 Yale L.J. 1386 (1937) ; 32 Va. L. Rev. 1164, 1168-73 (1946) and House Report 127-33.
112 See Major League-National Association Rule 5 and Art. Twenty-Seven of the
National Association Agreement.
113 Major League-National Association Rule S(g) prescribes which players are eligible
for draft. Generally speaking, players must have had a specified amount of experience in
the minors before they can be drafted by a major league dub. See p. 584 infra.
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league, and the National League alternates each year with the American
League on first selection. Thus, the eighth-place clubs have selections
1 and 2 respectively, and in one year the last place American League club
will have first choice and in the next the eighth-place National League
club will have first pick. The process of selection is repeated until each
club has no further right of selection" 4 or has signified that it does not
desire to select further. The price paid to a minor league club for any
player drafted is standardized, ranging from $15,000 for an Open Classi-
fication choice downward.
After the major leagues exercise their draft choices the minor leagues.
with priority based on classification, make their selections. Thus, the
Open Classification league comes first, followed by the Triple A leagues
and so on. The method of selection is otherwise substantially similar to
that of the major leagues described above.u1
Closely related to the draft rule is the waiver rule. The draft rule is
designed to permit a player to advance to as high a classification as his
skills merit. One of the aims of the waiver, on the other hand, is to pre-
vent a player from being dropped to a classification lower than his abil-
ities warrant. The other is to give club owners in the player's league
an opportunity to claim him before he is assigned to a league of equal
or lower classification. The gist of the rule is that before a player can
be assigned to play in a league of equal or lower classification his services
must be offered to the other club owners in the league in which he is
currently playing." 7 The amount another team has to pay for a player'
on waiver is specifically set forth in the rules.11
Other safeguards to counter abusive use of the reserve clause include
a minimum salary requirement in the major leagues and a provision for
salary arbitration in the minors. A major league player must be paid
at least $6,000 per year which is far below tLe average salary of $15,000
currently paid to big league ball players nl This minimum salary
proviso, coupled with the clause in the major league uniform player's
contract prohibiting a cut of more than 25 per cent from one season to
114 This results because there are limitations on the number of players any team may
have under contract. See Major League-National Association Rule 2(a).
115 Professional Baseball Agreement, Art. VI, J 2.
116 See National Association Agreement, Art. Twenty-Seven, 1 27.04.
117 See Major League Rule 10 and National Association Agreement, Art. Twenty-three.
Frequently major league teams use the waiver device for trading purposes. Major League
Rule 10(i) permits a club to put a player on waiver twice in a calendar year and then to
withdraw his name when he is claimed by another club. This procedure enables the
player's club to get an idea of the player's value on the market This information is helpful
in planning trades or sales of player contracts.
128 Major League Rule 10(k) and National Association Agreement, .ut. 23, 1 23.02(b)-
(4) (F).
119 See Hearings on Team Sports, pt. 1, 170.
1958]
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
the next, constitutes the major leaguer's protection against unreasonable
reductions in compensation.' The minor league player does not enjoy
a minimum salary requirement. However, he does have a certain degree
of protection. If he fails to agree on compensation, he can have the
matter arbitrated by the Executive Committee or the President of the
National Association.m
Another significant safeguard is the player limit, which is a limitation
on the maximum number of players each team can have under contract.
The illustration given at the commencement of this discussion on pro-
tective devices to avoid abusive use of the reserve clause shows the im-
portance of such a requirement to owners and players alike. However, a
congressional subcommittee raised the question whether the spirit, if not
the letter, of the player limit rule was being violated.M Members of that
committee contended that the farm system contravened the very purpose
of the rule since it permitted major league clubs to control indirectly
an unlimited number of players. To date, baseball has not acted on this
critique, and probably never will voluntarily, because to do so would
involve the destruction of the farm system, the maintenance of which
many affiliated with baseball consider important to the sport.'"
The player limit rule has not been the only safeguard to be criticized.
At the hearings held by the House Antitrust Subcommittee, several wit-
nesses, including Commissioner Frick and various players, testified that
under the existing draft and option rules, a major league club could
keep a player in the minors for seven years, and this was unfair to the
game of baseball as well as to the player concerned.?5 As an athlete's
playing life in baseball averages about fifteen years, they considered
seven years was too long for a team to be able to hold a player with
major league talent in the minors. This criticism was acted upon at the
joint meeting of the Major Leagues on December 6, 1957. At that time
the rules were amended to provide for the unrestricted draft of players
with four years experience in organized baseball.'" Thus, the amount
of time a player can be arbitrarily held in the minors has been reduced to
four years.
The safeguards in baseball are not perfect. No one realizes this more
120 Major League Uniform Player's Contract, clauses 2 and 10(a).
121 Minor League Uniform Player Contract, clause 11.
122 Major League Rule 2 and Major League-National Association Rule 2.
123 House Report, IS4-56.
124 The farm system is discussed in further detail Infra at note 177.
125 Hearings on Team Sports, pt. 1, at 170-71, 1241-43, 1277; pt. 2, at 1313, 1315-16. See
also Major League-National Association Rules 5(g) and 11(L).
126 This nformation was secured from a statement of the legislation adopted at the
joint meeting of the major leagues supplied to me by Louis F. Carroll, Esq, attorney for




than organized baseball itself.2' Howeirer, it would be unfair to say
that baseball is not interested in improving these safeguards. In those
instances where experience has demonstrated the need for change, base-
ball has responded reasonably well.
Up to this point we have described the so-called reserve clause practice.
We started with the clause as it exists in major and minor league players'
contracts; then showed how organized baseball justifies its authority to
impose sanctions on reserve clause violators; continued by demonstrat-
ing why baseball does not rely on the courts to enforce the reserve clause;
and completed the description by discussing the safeguards organized
baseball has placed on possible abuse of the reserve clause. Attention
is now turned to the arguments for and against the reserve clause prac-
tice. All arguments considered will have some relationship to the
application of the antitrust laws.
Suppose Congress should enact legislation making baseball subject to
the antitrust laws and subsequent suit should be brought.' What argu-
ments could baseball muster in defense of the reserve clause?
Under such circumstances, attorneys for the sport would probably
contend that even though the business of baseball in general is subject
to the antitrust laws, the reserve clause is not. Two jurisdictional argu-
ments would be advanced to sustain this position. The first would be
along the lines of Judge Chase's dissent in the Gardella case.1 '" There,
Judge Chase contended that Congress, in the enactment of the antitrust
laws, intended for them to cover restraints upon commercial competition
in the marketing of goods and services, not restraints upon employment.
Therefore, he asserted, the reserve clause, which is essentially a device
to control and regulate labor, is not subject to the antitrust laws, and
any problems concerning it fall into the realm of labor-management
relations rather than antitrust.
If suit should be brought against baseball involving a player who
had been blacklisted, the second argument would come into play. Base-
ball would contend that its refusal to employ such a person resulted from
a labor dispute, and therefore its action should not be held subject to the
12? Commissioner Frick In speaking of the draft and waiver rules said, *These rules
... have in general served their purpose. But they are not perfect and baseball has an
awareness of that fact. Hearings on Team Sports, pt. i, at 170.
128 If Congress should decide to do this, it would probably enact HR. S307 or HR. 5319
which were Introduced n 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (19S7). They are identical and the most
significant portion of each bill states: "The words 'trade or commerce' as used In any provi-
sions of the antitrust laws shall Include the Interstate business of organized professional base-
balL" These legislative proposals would overrule Federal Baseball and Toolson. Those
cases held that the business of baseball was not Interstate commerce. MIL 5307 and
H.L 5319 declare that baseball Is Interstate commerce. See p. 578 supra.
In See p. 571 supra. See also Apex Hosiery Co. v. Ieader, 310 U-S. 469, S0-01 (1940).
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Sherman Act. It would rely primarily on the Norris-LaGuardia Act,' °
section 20 of the Clayton Actn and United States v. HutciWso m to
uphold its position.
In labor disputes involving restraints upon trade or commerce, the
Hutcheson case requires that the two mentioned Acts and the Sherman
Act be read together.23 3 The Norris-LaGuardia Act includes as a "labor
dispute" any controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment
between one or more employers or associations of employers and one or
more employees regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in
the proximate relation of employer and employee.'?4 Section 20 of the
Clayton Act states in part:m'
... no . . . restraining order or injunction shall prohibit any person or
persons, whether singly or in concert... from ceasing to patronize or to
employ any party to such dispute, or ... persuading others by peace-
ful and lawful means so to do; ... nor shall any of the acts specified in
this paragraph be considered or held to be violations of any law of the
United States.
Thus, organized baseball would conclude that its concerted refusal to
deal with a player is outside the scope of the Sherman Act.
If these jurisdictional arguments failed, baseball's attorneys would
emphasize the vital importance of the reserve clause system. The classi-
cal argument in favor of the reserve clause is that if it were eliminated
there would be a chaotic scramble for player talent. The result would
be that the best players would join the clubs which could pay th..'m the
most money. Poorer clubs would be unable to compete for top talent,
and therefore, would be no match for the richer teams on the playing
field. Without competition, spectator interest would wither, leading first
to financial failure of the weaker clubs and eventually to the destruction
of the entire league. 36 Such a line of reasoning is a bit more than an
exercise of logic. The early history of baseball reveals that this was
exactly what happened in the days before there was a reserve clause."
Another argument offered in support of the reserve clause is that it
helps to preserve the integrity of the game on the field. Without this
clause, it is said that most players would probably be continuously shop-
ping around for a better job with another club for the next season;
some might be inveigled into "throwing"games to get a more lucrative
130 47 Stat. 70-73 (1932), 29 U.S.C. If 101-15 (1952).
131 3S Star. 738 (1914), 29 U.S.C. I 52 (1952).
132 312 US. 219 (1941).
133 Id. at 231-32.
134 47 Stat. 73 (1932), 29 U.S.C. It 113(a), 113(c) (1952). See also Comment, 62 Yale
LJ. 576 614-IS (1903).
135 38 Stat. 738 (1914), 29 U.S.C. I S2 (1952).
136 See Hearings on Team Sports, pt. 1, at 166; pt. 2, at 2725.
13? House Report 16-22.
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contract for the following year. Thereby, public confidence in the
game would be impaired. As in the case of the previous argument, this
one too is buttressed by the early history of basebalU.u
A third reason given for favoring the reserve clause is that a great
many of the teams in the minor leagues are not operated on the basis
of financial gain. It is said that they are maintained and financed in
many instances by citizens who take civic pride in having a team rep-
resent their community. If diese clubs did not have the protection of the
reserve clause to give them reasonable assurance of continuity of player
personnel, the incentive to maintain these clubs would be lost.
These three arguments coupled with the assertion that baseball is a
unique enterprise, requiring the cooperation of its members as partners
in order to maintain and promote equality of competition, would form
the basis for the contention that under the rule of reason the reserve
clause practice does not violate the Sherman Act. In support of this
position, baseball would undoubtedly lean heavily on Uited States v.
National Football League and seek comfort in the Appalacciax CoalW"
and Chicago Board of Trade41 cases. In these cases, despite arguments
by the government that the restraints involved were per se violations of
the Sherman Act, the courts considered evidence showing why these
restraints were reasonable under the particular circumstances.
Furthermore, those representing baseball might try to draw an analogy
between organized team sports and organized markets or exchanges, such
as the Chicago Board of Trade, New York Coffee and Sugar Exchange,
and New York Cotton Exchange. Organized markets are similar in cer-
tain respects to organized team sports. For instance, an exchange is a
combination of persons whose cooperation is essential to its operation.
These persons cooperate in establishing a multitude of rules and regula-
tions to govern the conduct of those who participate on the exchange.
These rules also provide for disciplinary action against members who
break them. However, the Supreme Court has never held that an ex-
change in the course of its ordinary operations is illegally operating in
restraint of trade.21 That Court has consistently refused to declare such
rules to be in violation of the antitrust laws. Time and time again it has
held that they are reasonable regulations which are needed to carry on
efficiently the business of those exchanges, and in no way unduly restrain
trade or commerce.143 Therefore, it might be contended that the rules
238 See HearlnMs on Team Sports) pt. 1 at 167.
129 Id. at 212.
140 Appalachian Coals Inc. Y. United States, 288 US. 344 (193I).
141 Board of Trade of City of Chicagov .Unted States, 246 U.S. 231 (1915).
142 Baer & Saxon, Commodity Exchangs and FUtur Trading 27002 (1949).
14P See, e.g. Cargi, Inc. v. Board of Trade of City of ChIcago 164 F.2d 820 (7th Cir.
19S81
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and regulations of organized baseball, just as those of oganized markets
and exchanges, are necessary to the successful operation of the sport
and are reasonable under the antitrust laws.
There are a number of substantial arguments which may be offered
in opposition to the reserve clause itself, as well as to meet the jurisdic-
tional arguments raised earlier. With respect to the latter, the replies of
Judges Hand and Frank to Judge Chase in the Gardela case make a
suitable starting point.1" Judge Hand contended that the Sherman Act
prohibits all restraints which were unlawful at common law. A contract
which unreasonably forbids a person to practice his trade is one of these.
Therefore, according to Judge Hand's logic, should the reserve clause
be found to restrict unreasonably a professioial ball player from plying
his trade, it would violate the Sherman Act. Judge Frank reached the
same conclusion by different reasoning. He believed that the Supreme
Court, in a series of decisions concerning medical services and motion
pictures,4 had interpreted "trade or commerce," as those words are
used in the Sherman Act, to include personal services. Consequently, he
concluded that an undue restraint upon employment would violate that
Act.
Moreover, it could be argued that if Congress enacted legislation plac-
ing baseball under the antitrust laws, it would intend for the entire busi-
ness of baseball, including the reserve clause, to be subject to those
statutes. To substantiate this statement references could be made to
many portions of the congressional hearings at which bills on this sub-
ject were considered. 1"l
With respect to the second jurisdictional argument, namely, the exemp-
tion of blacklisting from the operation of the Sherman Act, the point
could be made that Congress never intended an association of employers
to be able to deprive an individual unorganized worker of his means of
earning a livelihood without being subject to the Sherman Act. It would
be argued that the purpose of the Norris-LaGuardia and Clayton Acts,
the laws upon which the alleged exemption depends, is to permit labor
1947), cert. denied, 333 US. 880 (1948); Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange, 270 US.
593 (1926); United States v. New York Coffee and Sugar Exchange Inc, 263 US. 611
(1924); Board of Trade of City of Chicago v. United States, 246 US. 231 (1918). For an
excellent, brief discussion of the antitrust aspects of exchanges see Note, 64 Yale 1. 906
(19ss).
144 See p. 572 supra.
145 Judge Frank relied on the following cases: Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc, 327
US. 251 (1946); American Medical Association v. United States, 317 US. 519 (1943);
Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939); United States v. First Natiova
Pictures, Inc., 282 US. 44 (1930); Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282
US. 30 (1930); Blnderup v. Pathe Exchan, Inc., 263 US. 291 (1923).
140 See, e4, Hearings on Team Sports, pt. 1, 2, 6-7.
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unions and employers to engage in collective bargaining without the
threat of antitrust harassment, and not to cover situations unrelated to
the collective bargaining process. Therefore, while a concerted refusal
to deal growing out of a labor dispute connected with collective bargain-
ing would be exempt from the Sherman Act, a similar concerted action
against an individual unorganized employee would noOT.
Perhaps the most powerful argument that can be advanced against the
reserve clause practice is that it can be used as an economic weapon to
exclude outside competition. The history of organized baseball is
sprinkled with examples of how the reserve clause has been used for
such purpose."' s A brief hypothetical illustration will suffice to demon-
strate how this is done.
Suppose a group of businessmen wanted to start a third major league
without becoming ailiated with organized baseball. These men would
find it extremely difficult to hire good players because they would be
under perpetual contract with a club in organized baseball. If, however,
some did join the new league, not only would they be blacklisted by
organized baseball, but the teams on which they played would be unable
to hold games in ball parks owned by persons connected with organized
baseball 14' Moreover, these "renegade" players would find that they
could not make off-season money by "barnstorming" since the players
in organized baseball would be barred from playing either with or against
the reserve clause "jumpers?'" Under such strong economic coercion,
there would be little chance of the new league surviving very long 5
In short, then, the contention is that the use of the reserve clause prac-
tice in this manner amounts to a combination to exclude competition, and
should be held illegal under the Sherman Act.'
Another reason advanced in opposition to the reserve clause is that it
forces the player to give up so much of his freedom that he is reduced to
147 See Comment, 62 Yale L. J. 576, 615-21 (1953); Note, 53 Colum. L. Rev. 242, 249
n.71 (19S3).
148 See note 96 supra.
149 See House Report 114.
150 Id. at 79.
1251 At the congressional hearings In 1957, Commissioner Frick testified that there is no
rule barring prompt reinstatement of a player who jumps to an outside kague and said that
there are cases on record of players who, In recent years, have jumped their contract and
have been reinstated. It is true that Major League Rule 15 does permit the commissioner
to reinstate a reserve clause violator promptly. However, the section also gives the com-
mlssioner the power to blacklist such a player. The fact that Commissioner F-ick has been
benevolent and allowed several players to be reinstated does not mean that the commissioner
lacks the power to deny reinstatement. It should be kept In mind that not since the
Mexican League War In the late 1940's has organized baseball been threatened by outside
competition. Therefore, It could afford In more recent years to have a magnanimous attitude
toward erring players. See Hearings on Team Sports, pt. 1, 122-24.
152 See Assodated Press v. United Stals, 326 US. 1 (1943); Fasbhon OrIgnator' Guld
of America, Inc. v. Federal Trade Co n, 312 U". 4S7 (1941); Eastern States Retail
Lumber Deak' Asia v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914). See alo note 223 Infra.
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a status tantamount to peonage; therefore, it is contrary to the spirit of
the Conrtitution and public policy. Judge Bissell took this view in
American League Baseball Club of Chicago v. Chase."3 It was also ex-
pressed by Judge Frank in the Gardella case," and by others interested
in the game."
Finally, it may be claimed that the reserve clause is a price-fixing
device. The gist of the argument is that each player must sell his services
to the team which has him under reservation. If he dislikes the terms
offered, he is unable to sell his services elsewhere because of agreement
among clubs in organized baseball not to compete for services of a
player reserved by a member club. It is contended that the effect of this
arrangement is to permit each club to fix its own prices in the player
market; a per se violation of the Sherman Act.'"
In concluding this discussion of the reserve clause, it should be pointed
out that the vast majority of those who have studied baseball agree that
some sort of reserve clause is absolutely necessary "to protect the in-
tegrity of the game or to guarantee a comparatively even competitive
struggle."' 5 7 Although there have been a number of proposals recom-
mending modification of the reserve clause practice, there have been
relatively few suggesting its abandonment.
Let us now proceed to the next practice having important antitrust
implications--territorial rights. This practice and the reserve clause
have been called the "keystones of organized baseball."31
153 86 Misc. 441, 46S-66, 149 N.Y. Supp. 6, 19 (N.Y. Sup. CL Erie County 1914).
154 172 F2d at 409-10.
'55 See, e., Baseball Hearings 912.
256 One writer has argued that the reserve clause falls squarely within the doctrine of
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., Inc., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). Comment, 62 Yale
LJ. 576, 622 (1953). See also Anderson v. Shipowners Ass'n of the Pacific Coast, 272 US.
3S9 (1926); H. B. Marienelli, Ltd. v. United Booking Offices of America, 227 Fed. 165
(SI).N.Y. 1914). But cf. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933);
Board of Trade of City of Chicago v. United States, 246 US. 231 (1918). In the latter case
at page 238, the Court said:
... the legality of an agreement or regulation cannot be determined by so simple a
test, as whether it restrains competition. Every agreement concerning trade, every
regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain is of their very essence. The true test
of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps
thereby promotes competition or whether It is such as may suppress or even destroy
competition. To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts
peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after
the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and Its effect, actual or probable.
The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the
particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts.
Using the Chicago Board of Trade and Appalachian Coals cases as a foundation, a court
may find that the reserve clause is so important for promoting competition; keeping pro-
fesdonal team sports economically sound; and ensuring integrity on the playing field that
the agreement among club owners not to bid against each other for the services of players
Is a reasonable restraint of trade.
15T House Report, 229.




In essence, the rules governing territorial rights control the location
of all teams and leagues in organized baseball. 159 They provide the pro.
cedure for the relocation of clubs and the realignment of leagues as well
as for the reclassification of a minor league team to major league status.
The principal point to bear in mind from an antitrust viewpoint is that
these rules provide for the various teams in organized baseball to com-
bine for the purpose of dividing geographical territories and markets.
Just as in the case of the reserve clause, there are weighty arguments
for and against territorial rights. Those who support the practice claim
that without it baseball would be faced with a perilous economic situa-
tion.16° Teams would be able to shift around at will. Several teams
might move to a city which could support only one, and each would
suffer financial hardship; possibly all would be driven out of business.
Moreover, it is said* that under such economic conditions it would be
difficult to attract the investment capital baseball needs to operate suc-
cessfully. To this may be added the contention that the financial in-
equities which might arise from this unstable economic situation could
have a variety of detrimental effects on the athletic competition between
teams. Finally, the argument may be made that under these uncertain
financial conditions many young men graced with the necessary athletic
ability would no longer seek baseball as a career and the quality of the
competition would vastly deteriorate with the result that the American
public would no longer enjoy the high caliber game of today. 6'
The argument against territorial rights runs this way: The division
by organized baseball of territories and markets among competing teams
necessarily has the purpose and effect of eliminating competition. There-
fore, such an arrangement is a per se violation of the Sherman Act. 6 "2
Furthermore, in answer to the argument that the abolition of territorial
rights would bring economic chaos to baseball, one in oppogition to that
practice could reply that a favorite admonition of monopolistic combina-
tions in the past has been that if they were destroyed by court action,
Cruinous competition" in their respective industries would inevitably
follow.' 63 In fact, the results forecast have never occurred. Freedom of
159 See Major League Rule 1; Major League-National Association Rule 1; and National
Association Agreement §§ 10.06-10.08.
160 See, e.g., Hearings on Team Sports, pt. 1, at 168-69; 213-14.
161 As in the case of the reserve clause practice, baseball may also attempt to draw an
analogy between organized team sports and organized markets or exchanges. See text supra
note 142.
162 See Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); United States
v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 (1947); United States v. Addyston Pipe and Steel Co.,
85 Fed. 271, 291-93 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). But cf. United States v.
National Football League, 116 F. Supp. 319 (ED. Pa. 1953).
163 E.g., United States v. joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 576 (1898).
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competition in the long run has brought stability to industries rather
than economic destruction.
Before completing this phase of the discussion on territorial rights, it
should be pointed out that the rules governing this practice do not pro-
hibit anyone outside organized baseball from operating a team in any
city he may choose.164 However, in considering this factor, one must
also keep in mind the powers possessed by organized baseball under the
reserve clause. Although the regulations on territorial rights present no
bar to the newcomer, those relating to the reserve clause do. As pre-
viously stated, by blacklisting players and refusing teams which employ
them access to stadia controlled by it, organized baseball can make it
extremely difficult, if not impossible, for any rival to operate successfully.
In this regard, the reserve clause system serves to supplement the terri-
torial rights practice.
Radio and television broadcasting is fundamentally part of the terri-
torial rights problem. However, as broadcasting presents a rather unique
problem of substantial importance, it is considered separately.
Both Commissioner Frick and Mr. Trautman, President of the Na-
tional Association, testified before the House Antitrust Subcommittee
that the broadcasts of major league games into minor league territories
have an extremely harmful financial effect on minor league clubs.165
There are two reasons for this. One is that people are reluctant to pay
to see minor league teams play when they can sit at home and watch
big league baseball on television for nothing. The other is that as local
radio and television stations are able to broadcast major league games,
they are not interested in sponsoring minor league games. The com-
bined result of these two factors is that gate receipts of minor league
teams have dwindled sharply in recent years as have their broadcasting
revenues.
Organized baseball desired to alleviate this situation by making rules
which would prohibit, or at least diminish, the number of major league
broadcasts into minor league territories. However, when baseball of-
ficials broached this idea to the Department of Justice, they were warned
that if rules restricting the sale of radio and television rights should be
adopted, the Department would file an antitrust suit against organized
baseball.'66
While the business of baseball has been held to be exempt from the
antitrust laws under the Federal Baseball and Toolson decisions, there
is considerable doubt whether these cases would protect baseball from
164 See Baseball Hearings, 29; and Hearings on Team Sports, pt. 1, at 213.
165 Hearings on Team Sports, pt. 1, at 101-03; 190-01.
166 Id. at 102.
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an antitrust suit based solely on its radio and television activities. These
media of communication are clearly instrumentalities of interstate com-
merce, and while the internal operation of baseball itself is not subject
to the antitrust laws, baseball's interference with radio and television
rights may well constitute a section 1 violation of the Sherman Act.167
Section 1 provides that "every contract, combination . . . or con-
spiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States" is
illegal. Certainly it is plausible to argue that any agreement among
major league teams not to allow their games to be telecast into minor
league territories would place unreasonable restraints upon the radio and
television industries.
The theory of "collective refusal to deal" would lend support to this
position. The agreement in question would essentially keep all major
league games off the air unless broadcasters agreed to blackout those
games in minor league territories. Consequently, the agreement would
represent a concerted refusal to sell major league games to the broadcast-
ing industries unless certain conditions were met. Collective refusals to
deal have been consistently viewed with suspicion by the Supreme
Court.168
There is one case in particular which can be analogized to the pro-
posed situation. It is the Kiefer-Stewart case. 69 There the defendants
agreed not to sell their liquors to wholesalers unless they in turn agreed
not to resell above maximum prices set by the defendants. With respect
to this arrangement, the Supreme Court said that "the Sherman Act
makes it an offense for respondents to agree among themselves to stop
selling to particular customers.' 171 Consequently, it would appear that
the concerted refusal on the part of baseball to sell broadcasting rights
to buyers unless they adhere to certain conditions would likewise be
held to violate section 1 of the Sherman Act.
Furthermore, another line of reasoning may be offered in opposition
to such an agreement. Radio and television have placed major league
baseball in competition with clubs in the minors since major league
clubs enter minor league territories via the airwaves and compete with
minor league teams for customers in those markets. Consequently, the
argument could be made that the agreement not to telecast into minor
league territories would amount to an allocation or division of markets
167 Cf. United States v. National Football League, 116 F. Supp. 319, 327-28, (E.D. Pa.
1953) and the cases cited there.
168 See, e.g., Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 214
(19s1); United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 522 (1948); Associated Press
v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
169 Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., supra note 166.
170 Id. at 214.
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between the major and minor league teams which would be a per se
illegal restraint under the Sherman Act.'
If baseball decides to cast aside the Department of Justice's admoni-
tion, and promulgates rules to keep major league broadcasts out of
minor league territories, it must be prepared to prove that such restric-
tions on radio and television rights are essential to the successful survival
of minor league baseball. Obviously the destruction of minor league
baseball would have damaging consequences on players, owners, sports
fans, and commercial enterprises doing business with minor league teams.
Furthermore, without stable minor leagues, there would be a degeneracy
in the caliber of major league baseball so that the public would be
deprived of the high quality entertainment of the present day game.
Therefore, it could be argued that it would be in the public interest to
allow these regulations. If a court were swayed by such argument, it
could decide in favor of organized baseball along the lines pioneered
by Judge Grim in United States v. National Football League.17
One further question on the subject of broadcasting rights remains to
be discussed. Assuming major league broadcasts are ruining minor
leagues financially, nothing prevents each major league team, individ-
ually, from refusing to permit its games to be broadcast into minor
league territories. The decisions of the Supreme Court, beginning with
United States v. Colgate & Co.'73 in 1919, have consistently recognized
an individual refusal to deal as a general right.174 Exactly why each
major league club has not acted on its own to save the minors is un-
known. The question was put to Commissioner Frick at the House
Antitrust Subcommittee hearings and he answered flatly, "I don't
know."' 75 Two "educated guesses" are advanced. One is that each team
fears that if it restricts broadcasts and thus limits its revenues, other
teams will not do likewise and it will be at a competitive disadvantage.
The other is that the teams are afraid that such action may nonetheless
be interpreted as a concerted refusal to deal under the doctrine of "con-
scious parallelism."'
7 6
Another practice with antitrust implications is the farm system.
"When baseball clubs in leagues of lower classification are owned or
171 See note 162 supra.
172 Cf. Comment, 63 Yale LJ. 372, 387 (1954). See also note 161 supra.
173 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
174 The exception to this general rule occurs when the individual refusal to sell is
"accompanied by unlawful conduct or agreement, or conceived in monopolistic purpose or
market control." Times Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 625 (1953).
See also Lorain journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 155 (1951). I do not believe
this exception applies to the instant situation.
175 Hearings on Team Sports, pt. 1, at 102.
176 For an excellent, brief discussion of "conscious parallelism" see Rep. Atty. Gen.
Comm. to Study Antitrust Laws 36-42 (1955).
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controlled by a baseball club of higher classification, normally a major
league, they comprise a farm system or chain.1' 177 The control may
result from stock ownership in the team of lower classification, or from
working agreements.
A working agreement is a relationship between two clubs in which
the club of higher classification agrees to do certain things for the lower
club, and in return gains a certain degree of control over the manage-
ment and players of the club of lower classification. These agreements
are by no means uniform. The exact terms and conditions of each
working agreement vary according to the relative bargaining power of
the two teams involved. One working agreement may require a major
league club to furnish a minor league team with a substantial number of
things such as money, the benefit of the major league club's scouting
system, a certain number of players, and so on, in order for the major
league club to gain the player control it desires. Another agreement
may permit the major league club to gain this control by giving up com-
paratively little.
178
From what has been said, then, the chief objective of the farm system
is to control baseball players in leagues of lower classification. This
logically raises the question of whether this kind of vertical integration
violates the Sherman or Clayton Acts.
Although the courts have not been consistent in their approaches to
problems on vertical integration, 179 and although the present status of the
law is not crystal clear,180 a few basic tenets may nonetheless be stated.
Vertical integration is not illegal per se and despite the uncertainty in
this area, two tests seem definitely appropriate for guiding the applica-
tion of the rule of reason. First, a vertical acquisition is illegal if it is
part of a deliberate plan to confrol a substantial share of a market and
suppress competition rather than an expansion to meet legitimate busi-
ness needs. Second, a vertical acquisition is illegal whenever it results
177 House Report, 177.
178 See Baseball Hearings, 159-60; 206-07.
179 For a time courts seemed to move in the direction that vertical integration was
illegal per se. United States v. Lehigh Valley R.R. Co., 254 U.S. 255 (1920); Compare
United States v. Reading Co., 253 U.S. 26 (1920); United States v. New York Great A. & P.
Tea Co., 173 F.2d 79 (7th Cir. 1949). This movement reached its climax with United
States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 226-27 (1947). There, the Supreme Court seemed
to specifically state that vertical integration was illegal per se. However, the Court backed
away from this position in United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 173-74
(1948), and shortly later, in United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 524-25
(1948) made it doubly clear that vertical integration was not illegal per se. Compare the
tests laid down for what constitutes illegal vertical integration in the Columbia Steel case
(at 524-25) with the test stated by Judge Augustus Hand in United States v. Paramount
Pictures, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 881, 893 (S.D.N.Y. 1949). See also United States v. E. I.
du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
180 See Bork, "Vertical Integration and the Sherman Act: The Legal History of an
Economic Misconception," 22 U. Chi. L. Rev. 157, 193-94 (1954).
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in creating the power to exclude competition and is coupled with the
purpose or intent to do so. 181
When these tests are applied to baseball, substantial arguments, both
pro and con, can be made with respect to the farm system. To explain
baseball's defense, a bit of the history of the farm system is necessary.
Branch Rickey, perhaps more than anyone else, is responsible for the
farm system.1 82 He developed the system while he was an executive of
the St. Louis Cardinals in the 1920's. In those days, the Cardinals were
among the poorer clubs in the National League and usually finished the
season in the second division. He used the farm system as a means of
building up the Cardinals. The system proved very successful. In those
early years, it was a relatively inexpensive way of obtaining and training
young talent for the big league arena. Soon the Cardinals produced great
teams which won a number of pennants. To keep pace with the com-
petition on the field, other teams began to build up farm systems.
In view of this history, defenders of the practice would argue that
the operation of farm systems, from their incipiency, has never tended
to suppress competition, but rather to stimulate it, and that in the case
of each major league club farm system expansion was necessary to
stay in competition with the other clubs in the league. Moreover, none of
these vertical integrations has ever resulted in giving any club the
power to exclude competition. No single club has ever gained enough
of a foothold on the player market to exclude the other fifteen major
league teams. On the contrary, the competition among these clubs for
player talent has continued to be substantial.
18 3
Critics, 1' on the other hand, take the view that a few clubs, such as
the New York Yankees and the Los Angeles Dodgers, through their vast
farm systems, have been able to control large portions of the player
market. These clubs have under their control far more players than they
need,185 and the only reason they keep so many players tied up in their
farm systems is to suppress competition. As long as the Yankees or
Dodgers have this talent under contract, they know these players can-
not be hitting home runs and making dazzling plays for competing major
league clubs. This, it is urged, is unfair both to the players who are
deliberately kept from advancing and to the clubs who are blocked from
181 United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 173-74 (1948); United
States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 524-25 (1948). Mr. Justice Douglas wrote the
Paramount opinion. Compare his dissent in Columbia Steel at 537-39. See Bork, supra
note 180, at 185-94.
182 See Baseball Hearings, 987-95.
183 See note 161 supra.
184 See, e.g., Comment, 62 Yale L.J. 576, 625 (1953).
185 For a break-down of the number of players under control by each major league team
see Hearings on Team Sports, pt. 2, at 1901-3.
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using their services."8 6 Consequently, those opposed to the farm system
would conclude that, since it is being used as a method to suppress com-
petition, rather than as a means of permitting clubs to expand to meet
legitimate business needs, it should be banned.
No discussion of baseball's practices would be complete without giving
some consideration to the opinions of players concerning the reserve
clause. As they have had to live with this practice, certainly consider-
able weight should be accorded their views with respect to the fairness
of, as well as the need for, the reserve clause. Both active and former
players testified before the House Antitrust Subcommittee in 1951 and
in 1957. The overwhelming consensus of their opinions was that the
reserve clause was absolutely essential to baseball and that, on the whole,
they did not consider this practice to be unfair to players.11
7
Hockey
Organized professional hockey consists of the National Hockey
League, hockey's major league, and three minor leagues of equal
status. 118 Their operations cover the United States and Canada. Each
league is governed by its own constitution and by-laws, while all the
leagues are welded together by a joint affiliation agreement. 89 Unlike
baseball, teams in the National Hockey League have surprisingly little
control over the teams in the three minor leagues. Major league mem-
bers control only three teams in the minors.190
Both the major league and minor league teams in professional hockey
gain most of their player control through a series of agreements with
teams in the Canadian Amateur Hockey Association and the Amateur
Hockey Association of the United States. The term "amateur" as used
here is deceiving. In hockey, anyone who does not play with one of
the four professional leagues is considered an amateur. Thus, in the
upper levels of competition under amateur jurisdiction the players are
in fact paid regularly and in some instances quite substantially.
Professional teams have a wide variety of arrangements with amateur
clubs concerning players. In addition, each professional team is per-
mitted to sponsor two amateur clubs under mutually agreeable ar-
186 Compare text supra note 125.
187 See Baseball Hearings, 11-19; 589-90; 847-48; 852; 859. See also Hearings on Team
Sports, pt. 1, at 1233-47; pt. 2, at 1305-09; 1380-83. Some players did, however, suggest
certain improvements in the safeguards on the reserve clause. The most important sugges-
tion was that the draft and option rules be changed to reduce the number of years a player
has to spend in the minors. This suggestion has been adopted by baseball. See note 126
supra.
188 The three minor leagues include the American Hockey League, the Western Hockey
League and the Quebec Hockey League, Inc.
189 Reprinted in Hearings on Team Sports, pt. 3, at 3112-22.
390 Id. at 2984-85.
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rangements. These sponsorships vary from very modest arrangements to
full scale operation and control. Approximately 95 per cent of the
players who find their way into organized professional hockey are prod-
ucts of the sponsorship system.191
The National Hockey League, of course, is the most important league
in professional hockey. It is administered primarily by a President
and Board of Governors. Each member of the league selects a person
to represent it on the Board. The Governors in turn select a President.
The President of the National Hockey League is usually looked upon
as the chief spokesman for organized hockey. Although his advice is often
sought by the other professional leagues, and although he gives the initial
interpretation on joint affiliation agreement problems, he has no control
whatever over minor league matters. 92 In this regard, hockey differs
from baseball. It has no true counterpart to the Commissioner of
Baseball.
Although all professional team sports are modeled after baseball, their
oldest and most successful peer, none parallel baseball's operations more
closely than hockey. Its practices are almost identical to those of base-
ball. Consequently, hockey today has as part of its modus operandi the
reserve clause practice with its various attendant safeguards, 19 3 terri-
torial rights,'94 and the farm system. For all practical purposes, the
arguments advanced for and against baseball's practices apply equally
to hockey,'95 including the recognition by hockey players of the need
for the reserve clause.
96
Football
Organized professional football in the United States is synonymous
with the National Football League. This league is composed of 12 teams
divided into two conferences, the so-called Eastern and Western Con-
ferences. It is governed by the constitution and by-laws of the National
191 Id. at 2981.
192 Id. at 2994.
193 There are a few minor differences between baseball's and hockey's reserve clause
practice. Hockey has no minimum salary requirement. In case of player salary disputes,
the President of the National Hockey League arbitrates the matter. Hearings on Team
Sports, pt. 3, at 2982. The draft though having the same purpose and effect as baseball's
differs in its operation. Id. at 2983-84.
194 There are no restrictions on radio and television rights. Each team contracts with
broadcasting companies individually. Hence there is no antitrust problem in this area at
the moment.
195 The one argument that would have no application would be the one advanced by
organized baseball that many minor league teams are community endeavors which are
losing propositions, financially, and without the reserve clause to give these teams some
sort of personnel continuity the public spirited citizens owning such teams would no longer
try to maintain them.
196 See, e.g., Hearings on Team Sports, pt. 3, at 3005.
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Football League.19 7 The principal administrator of the rules and regula-
tions set forth therein is the Commissioner of Football who is elected
by the club owners. He is assisted in the management of league affairs
by the Executive Committee which consists of one representative from
each member club.
The reserve clause in football operates on the same general principle
as the one in baseball. 198 However, this practice in football differs from
that in baseball in two important particulars. First, in football, the
clause is buttressed by the "player selection system" or "draft." Second,
it is not perpetual, but is limited to a single option to renew. In short,
each contract signed by a player is for two years, instead of for his
entire playing lifetime.
Each year all football players graduating from American colleges be-
come subject to the draft. At an annual selection meeting, the National
League team which finished the previous season in last place is given
first choice of the players. In reverse order to the standing of the
clubs at the end of the preceding season, each club chooses one player
per round. The rounds continue in the same order until all clubs have
selected 30 players each. If a college player wants to play in the Na-
tional Football League, he must play for the team which drafts him,
unless the drafting club agrees to assign him to another club.
As in the case of baseball, football has placed certain safeguards on
the operation of the reserve clause. In addition to the two year limita-
tion mentioned it has a waiver rule similar in principle to the one in
baseball, 199 and a player limit rule.2°° There is no minimum salary re-
quirement20' or provision for salary arbitration. As football does not
have any minor league, there is no need for a "draft" provision similar
to the one in baseball.
The arguments advanced, both pro and con, with regard to baseball's
reserve clause apply for the most part to football. However, the two
year limitation and player selection system provide the basis for some
deviation.
Football claims that its reserve clause is the best in sports today.
202
The contention is that the National Football League contract gives the
player tremendous bargaining power since he is in the position to peddle
his services elsewhere at the end of two years if his club fails to meet his
197 Reprinted in Hearings on Team Sports, pt. 2, at 2580a.
198 See National Football League Standard Players Contract, clauses 4, 10, 11. Contract
is reprinted in Hearings on Team Sports, pt. 3, at 2748-S0.
199 National Football League Constitution, Art. XV.
200 Id. at Art. XIV.
201 See Hearings on Team Sports, pt. 3, at 2511-12.
202 Id. at 2728.
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terms. Not only can such a player offer his services to American teams
but also to Canadian clubs which compete with the NFL for American
talent. In view of the attributes of this clause, football takes the position
that it is reasonable and should not be struck down by the antitrust laws.
With respect to the player selection system, the sentiments of pro-
fessional football have been voiced 'by Commissioner Bell.203 He stated
that prior to the adoption of the draft a few wealthy teams, known as
the "Big Four"-the Chicago Bears, Green Bay Packers, Washington
Redskins and New York Giants, controlled the best players in the
league, and won almost all the championships. Between 1933 and 1945,
the Big Four won 252 games and lost only 59 against other teams in the
league. According to the Commissioner, the lack of athletic competition
between the Big Four and the lesser lights in the league caused these
richer clubs to prosper and the rest of the league to suffer. Finally, the
player draft was adopted. Since that time, the story in the league has
been different. Between 1945 and 1956, the same Big Four won only
133 and lost 136 games against those same teams. Commissioner Bell
said that the difference in competition was due to the draft system. He
further pointed out that the increased attendance at professional foot-
ball games making possible higher salaries for players is due in great
measure to the player selection system. In the light of these circum-
stances, football claims that this practice is certainly not an 'unreasonable
restraint upon trade or commerce since it has fostered competition rather
than stifled it.
There are a number of arguments, however, which may be assembled
in opposition to the two-year reserve clause and the player selection
system. It has been asserted that the competitive benefit claimed for the
two-year reserve clause is a mirage.20 4 If, after two years, a star player
wanted to sell his services to another club, it is said, that as a practical
matter, he would be unable to do so. The contention is that although
other clubs might be tempted to sign the star at a higher salary, they
would instead respect the perpetual right of his past owner in order that
the same treatment would be accorded them if the situation were re-
versed. Thus, the player's services would be unmarketable for the reason
that all clubs would recognize that any attempt to raid another club's
players would raise salaries and thereby defeat the very purpose of the
reserve clause. Evidently, no player has ever voluntarily, at the end of
the two year period, joined another club. This, it is claimed, lends sup-
port to the argument that the two-year reserve clause is a mirage.20 5
203 Id. at 2725-28.




The player selection system, moreover, completely eliminates com-
petition among the clubs for new players. The clubs, in effect, have di-
vided up the players' market so that each club has absolute control over
the price it will pay "rookies." Since the purpose and effect of this ar-
rangement is to fix the price of players' services, it may be advocated
that such an arrangement should be held illegal per se as a price-fixing
device.206
Furthermore, the argument on "peonage" advanced by Judge Frank in
the Gardella case would once again seem to be appropriate.20 7 If a
player wants to participate in organized professional football in the
United States, he must, for all practical purposes, join the club which
drafts him. Hence, it may be contended that such dictation over a
person's freedom to select his employer is contrary to public policy.
The territorial rights question in football, as it relates to the geo-
graphical division of markets among clubs, is the same as in baseball.
However, football has no radio and television problem at the moment.
This dilemma was settled in United States v. National Football League,
apparently to the satisfaction of the parties concerned. °s
Professional football teams have no farm systems. Their players, by
and large, receive their apprenticeship in the colleges and universities
throughout the country. Nonetheless, it is interesting to note in passing
that the National Football League Constitution provides for working
agreements, one of the means of building farm systems.20 9
The House Antitrust Subcommittee in its 1957 Hearings, sought the
views of players on the reserve clause and the player selection system.
Practically all of these witnesses endorsed football's need for such
practices.210
Basketball
At present organized professional basketball consists of one league,
the National Basketball Association. 11 It has an eastern and western
division of four teams each, and its operations are confined to the United
States. The activities of the NBA, as this league is popularly called, are
governed by its constitution and by-laws.1 2
206 Cf. p. 592 and n.156.
207 See note 154 supra.
208 See statement of Ass't Att'y. Gen. Hansen, Hearings on Team Sports, pt. 1, at 40;
National Football League Constitution, Art. X, particularly § 3 (b).
209 Art. I, § 19.
210 See Hearings on Team Sports, pt. 3, at 2582-2624, 2679. Norman Van Brocklin did
not think the draft was essential. Id. at 2677. George Ratterman did not feel strongly one
way or the other with regard to these practices. Id. at 2680.
211 At one time there were two leagues, the Basketball Association of America and the
National Basketball League. In 1949, they merged to form the National Basketball Associa-
tion. Hearings on Team Sports, pt. 3, at 2905.




The President of the National Basketball Association, Board of Gov-
ernors, and Executive Committee, are primarily responsible for adminis-
tering the affairs of the league. The Board of Governors consists of a
representative from each club. Among other things, the Board selects
the President and members of the Executive Committee. The Presi-
dent's powers and functions are similar to those possessed by the execu-
tive heads of other team sports.2 13 The Executive Committee is sort of a
"catch all" committee. It has the power to -decide all matters not
specifically vested by the constitution and by-laws in the President or
Board.
2 14
The practices of basketball which have antitrust implications, though
similar to other team sports, most closely resemble those of football.
Basketball, like football, has no farm system, and depends on the player
selection system for recruiting its players from college campuses2 15 Ex-
cluding the broadcasting aspects, its territorial rights problem is the
same as that of any team sport. Basketball's reserve clause is of the
"perpetual option" variety, like baseball and hockey, rather than of the
"limited option" type employed by football. 16
The arguments for and against football's player selection system apply
with equal force to basketball. The pros and cons discussed with re-
spect to baseball's reserve clause and territorial rights practices, other
than the radio and television problem, apply generally to basketball
2 17
Also, players testified at congressional hearings that the draft and re-
serve clause were essential to basketball.1 8
With regard to broadcasting, basketball may have a problem brewing.
Individual teams in the NBA do not negotiate their own contracts with
television networks.21 9 The Association acts in concert on these matters.
Each television network agreement is negotiated by the President of
the National Basketball Association. However, he does not sign it. The
contract is submitted to the Board of Governors who either accept or
reject the deal. The Association has been deliberately trying to equalize
the number of exposures each club has on network television. Exactly
213 See id. at 2943.
214 Id. at 2945.
215 There is one minor difference between the basketball and football draft systems.
In basketball, if a college player graduates in the territory of a franchise holder, then that
club gets first choice on that player's services. For a description of how the basketball draft
works see Hearings on Team Sports, pt. 3, at 2906.
216 The safeguards on basketball's reserve clause include the waiver and player limit
rule. However, there is no minimum salary requirement or provision for salary arbitration.
Moreover, as basketball has no farm system, it has no "draft" similar to baseball and hockey.
217 See note 195 supra.
218 See Hearings on Team Sports, pt. 3, at 2897-99, 2904.
219 This paragraph is based on testimony which appears at pp. 2882-84 of pt. 3 of the
Hearings on Team Sports.
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how much pressure the NBA uses in getting a television network to
broadcast one game instead of another is not known. If the networks
do not particularly care which games are telecast, that is one thing,
but if the Association demands that the networks take the games it
specifies or none at all, that may be held an unreasonable restraint upon
"trade or commerce" in violation of the Sherman Act.22°
Conclusions
The organization and practices of professional team sports are funda-
mentally the same. To be sure there are some differences. For in-
stance, the player selection system is peculiar to football and basket-
ball, whereas the farm system is found only in baseball and hockey.
These differences are not important enough, however to justify separate
legislative treatment of each of these sports or of any one of them. Cer-
tainly whatever antitrust laws govern one should apply to the others.
Thus, no sound basis exists for the current distinction between baseball
and other professional team sports.
With regard to the antitrust aspects of practices involved in these
sports, there are strong arguments for contending they violate the Sher-
man Act, while, at the same time there are substantial reasons for as-
serting they do not. There are two exceptions to this statement. Both
concern the reserve clause system.
First, it is highly improbable that courts would decide that the reserve
clause is outside the jurisdiction of the Sherman Act. The argument that
restraints upon players' services cannot amount to "restraints of trade"
within the meaning of the antitrust laws is unsound and should fall.
In addition to the reasons discussed earlier, 221 the Supreme Court as
far back as 1926, in the case of Anderson v. Shipowners Association,
222
declared that restraints involving employment services may come within
the Sherman Act.2 3 Similarly, the jurisdictional argument that the
Norris-LaGuardia Act and section 20 of the Clayton Act permit base-
ball to blacklist players with impunity under the Sherman Act should
fail. The Norris-LaGuardia and Clayton Acts were designed to permit
self-help in labor disputes growing out of collective bargaining situa-
220 See p. 594 supra.
221 See p. 590 supra.
222 272 U.S. 359 (1926).
223 In the Anderson case the Supreme Court held that a combination of shipowners
and operators who refused to deal with seamen except on the terms and conditions set by
the combination was illegal under section 1 of the Sherman Act. The Court in 272 U.S. at
363 stated that the Sherman Act prohibits combinations which would unduly interfere with
those who wish to engage in trade and commerce. Consequently, assuming organized pro-
fessional team sports to be interstate commerce, the collective effort of clubs in any of
these sports to prevent a player from engaging in that sport would seem to be a clear
violation of the Sherman Act.
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tions without the threat of retribution under the antitrust laws. They
were not meant to exempt from those laws a concerted refusal to deal
with an employee which is unrelated to the collective bargaining
process.224 Hence, any holding in favor of this jurisdictional argument
would be contrary to the purpose and intent of those Acts.
Secondly, although a court may find the reserve clause itself (i.e.
the contract as opposed to the sanctions to enforce it) is reasonable
under the Sherman Act, it is difficult to imagine how the rule of reason
can be stretched to encompass that part of the reserve clause practice
which is used as a weapon to destroy outside competition. It is one thing
to use the reserve clause to maintain competitive athletic balance in a
given league, but it is quite another to attempt to stifle a competing
league which attempts to hire players. Unquestionably, any use of the
reserve clause practice in that manner would be quashed by the courts.
2 25
Aside from these two exceptions, it is most difficult indeed to predict
with substantial certainty whether the courts will or will not uphold
the practices involved in organized team sports as reasonable restraints
upon trade or commerce. It is at this point that justifiable prognostica-
tion fades into unreliable speculation.
There can be no doubt that. professional team sports constitute a
unique type of business. Their practices, though strange to the rest of
the commercial world, have grown up by trial and error, and in large
measure, have been found by experience to be essential to their sur-
vival. Yet, the judiciary, through its unfamiliarity in this field and by
indiscriminately applying conventional per se concepts, may completely
destroy the foundations upon which these sports are built. In order to
avoid this possibility, and its consequent detrimental effect on profes-
sional team sports as well as the general public, Congress should enact
appropriate legislation in this area. Even the Supreme Court has recog-
nized that Congress is better equipped to deal with the problem of
professional team sports than the judiciary. Surely this is what the
Court had in mind when it stated in the Radovich case :226
224 See note 147 supra.
225 To the extent that the reserve clause is used as a war measure to stifle outside
competition it would probably be held to violate both sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.
The use of boycotts and blacklists in such tactics would violate section 1. See Fashion
Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 312 U.S. 457 (1941);
Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914). More-
over, it could probably be successfully argued that each of the existing organized team sports
is a monopoly since each one virtually controls the supply in its respective market of
selling to the public exhibitions in either professional baseball, football, basketball or
hockey. Consequently, the use of power to exclude competition would provide the necessary
element for the offense of monopolization under section 2. See Rep. Atty. Gen. Comm. to
Study Antitrust Laws 43 (1955).
226 352 U.S. at 452.
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Congressional processes are more accommodative, affording the whole
industry hearings and an opportunity to assist in the formulation of new
legislation. The resulting product is therefore more likely to protect the in-
dustry and the public alike.
III. POLICY AND CONGRESSIONAL ALTERNATIVES
It is generally agreed that all professional team sports should be
treated alike under the antitrust laws and that Congress should eliminate
the present discrimination which exists in favor of 'baseball. The major
question, of course, is how this should be done. Congress has the choice
of several approaches to the problem. One would be to grant team sports
complete exemption from those laws. Another would be to enact legisla-
tion making such sports subject to existing antitrust legislation. A
third would be to establish a governmental agency to regulate team
sports. Finally, Congress could grant these sports some type of partial
exemption.
Legislation based on the first approach--complete immunity-would
be absolutely unjustified. A statute of this type would mean that or-
ganized team sports could engage in any type of business activity and
be completely free from antitrust penalty. Thus, they could place un-
reasonable restraints on broadcasting rights. They could use all kinds of
concerted methods to exclude outside competition, and they would be
free to compete unfairly in many other commercial endeavors. The sur-
vival of organized team sports does not require such immunity. Even
spokesmen for these sports were unable to offer the slightest justification
for this kind of carte blanche legislation.2 7 Surely such a broad exemp-
tion could not be granted without doing considerable injury to the basic
policy of competition upon which all antitrust laws are based.2
However, to place organized team sports completely under the anti-
trust laws would also be unwise. Until the Radovich case was decided
in 1957, it was logical to think that other professional team sports shared
baseball's immunity from the antitrust laws. That decision made it
clear that other sports were not so fortunate. At the same time, the
Supreme Court urged Congress to take legislative action in this field.
All those interested in this problem are waiting to see what Congress
will do. Consequently, from a practical point of view, it can be said
that potential litigants have been hesitant to file suits against any team
sport because until 1957 they considered all team sports to be exempt
227 See, e.g., Hearings on Team Sports, pt. 3, at 2995.
228 The objective of all statutes in the field on antitrust is to ensure the nation a com-
petitive economy. This has been stated frequently by the Supreme Court as the basic
objective of the antitrust laws. See, e.g., Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States 345
U.S. 594, 605 (1953); Standard Oil Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 340 U.S. 231, 248-49
(1951); United States v. South-Eastern Underwxiters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 559 (1944).
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from the antitrust laws. Now they are waiting to see what course Con-
gress will take before they make their moves.
The enactment of legislation making all team sports subject to the
antitrust laws would bring with it a large amount of litigation. Due to
the paucity of settled legal principles in this area, these sports would
become the targets for disgruntled players and perhaps for the De-
partment of Justice. No matter how these cases were ultimately decided,
professional team sports, and indeed, the public, would be adversely
affected. Assume that eventually the courts substantially upheld all of
the practices employed by these sports as reasonable under the antitrust
laws. To reach that point would take years of costly litigation. In the
process several clubs would probably be driven into bankruptcy. The
net result would be economic instability in professional team sports
for a number of years to come with an attendant detrimental effect upon
athletic competition, players, sports fans, and the communities in which
clubs operate.229
Let us examine the probability of bankruptcy more closely since that
assumption may seem incredible. Baseball, the titan of professional
team sports is but a midget in the world of finance. In 1956 the total
gross income from all the sources of organized baseball in the United
States was approximately $65 million. This is less than one-half the
volume of business done in the same year by a single department store
in New York City.2 30
To get more specific, in the period 1952-56 two major league clubs
suffered considerable financial losses each year, and five others lost
much more than they made over the same five years.131 Were it not for
the fact that most big league teams are backed by a number of independ-
ently wealthy men more interested in the "psychic income" of winning
teams than financial profits,2 32 a number of clubs would have gone bank-
rupt before now. It is extremely doubtful, however, whether these in-
vestors are such sportsmen that they would hang onto teams losing
money which are also plagued with the added expense and inconvenience
of defending treble damage suits.
As for other team sports, six out of eight clubs in the National Basket-
ball Association had net losses on their operations over the past six
years.233 Two of the six hockey teams in the National Hockey League
suffered losses each year during the period 1952-56, and one other lost
229 See Seymour, "Ball, Bat and Bar," 6 Clev.-Mar. L. Rev. 534, 535-36 (1957).
230 Hearings on Team Sports, pt. 1, at 165.
231 Id. at 353.
232 See House Report 91-92.
233 Hearings on Team Sports, pt. 3, at 2928, 2935.
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more than it earned for the same five years 34 In football, one club had
losses for each year during that same time span.2' 5 Obviously then,
there are a number of clubs in organized team sports which could be
pushed into bankruptcy by protracted antitrust litigation.
Suppose, on the other hand, the courts struck down the practices upon
which these teams are dependent. Not only would the litigation involve
the financial problems and consequences previously discussed, but such
judicial determination would spell the end of professional team sports
as they are known today. There would probably be a return to chaotic
economic conditions similar to those which existed in baseball prior to
the adoption of the reserve clause, 36 and in football before the player
selection system was put into effect.2aT Certainly, the restoration of such
conditions should be avoided.
The second approach-making all team sports subject to the anti-
trust laws-is unfeasible and must be rejected. Enactment of such legis-
lation would tend to lessen competition rather than promote it. As a
consequence of the litigation which would follow, a number of teams
would either be driven into bankruptcy or become so pressed financially
that they would be unable to compete efficiently with the richer clubs in
the league. Moreover, if certain practices, such as the player selection
system and the reserve clause were eliminated by judicial decision, there
would be a repetition of the competitive inequities which existed before
the adoption of these measures.
The third alternative which suggests a governmental agency for sports
must also be discarded. Aside from the intricacies of drafting legislation
to set up this agency, the hearings held by Congress in 1951 and again
in 1957 produced no evidence to justify the establishment of a govern-
ment bureau to regulate sports. Without strong proof that the affairs of
team sports demand close governmental supervision, it would be im-
proper for Congress to conduct such an experiment at the expense of
the American taxpayer.
The best approach is one which would grant a partial exemption to or-
ganized professional team sports. In this way, practices considered essen-
234 Id. at 3131-46.
235 Id. at 2566. Although only one team suffered losses each year for the period 1952-56,
the profits of the other clubs were not huge. Serious litigation could do great harm to
almost any of them. This is reflected in Commissioner Bell's statement before Congress
where he said (id. at 2734):
Very frankly, gentlemen, our league would not be financially able to bear the cost of
such litigation. We are very hopeful, therefore, that you will recommend specific or
general legislation which will give approval of Congress to our present practices and
render it unnecessary for us to have to establish in the courts that they are reasonable
practices.
236 See House Report 16-22, 229.
237 Hearings on Team Sports, pt. 3, at 2725-27. Compare id. 2906-07.
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tial to the successful survival of these sports could be given immunity
from the antitrust laws, while their other business activities would be
held subject to those laws. This alternative would permit Congress to
side-step the pitfalls of the first two approaches discussed.
Although the "partial exemption" alternative provides the best ap-
proach to drafting legislation on the antitrust aspects of professional
team sports, the value of any bill using this approach would depend,
of course, on the exact nature of the exemption. For example, the House
Antitrust Subcommittee adopted this approach in the bill it recently
recommended to the Judiciary Committee.2 38 Yet there is grave doubt
as to whether this bill is satisfactory.
The bill in question would give professional baseball, basketball, foot-
ball and hockey a partial exemption from the antitrust laws 39 If en-
acted, it would presumably exempt reasonable reserve clauses, player
drafts, and farm systems from the scope of those laws.24° The bill also
would permit professional team sports to impose reasonable territorial
restrictions on teams and to impose such reasonable restraints on tele-
vision and radio broadcasting as are needed to preserve these terri-
tories.241
The difficulty with the bill is that its exemptions are not specific
enough. For instance, what is a reasonable reserve clause? Should it
be able to give a club a perpetual option on the playing services of an
athlete, or should it be limited to a specific number of years? If the
latter, what should be the duration of the limitation-two, four, five or
just how many years? As the playing life of a professional baseball
player is much longer than that of a professional football player, should
a baseball club be able to hold a player under reservation longer than a
football team? If so, how much longer?
Moreover, exactly what safeguards should surround a reasonable re-
serve clause? Should there be a minimum salary requirement? If so,
what should the amount be? Is a requirement for the arbitration of
salary disputes necessary? Should these safeguards be the same for
each organized professional team sport?
The foregoing are but a few of the questions which would have to be
answered to determine what reserve clauses would be reasonable. Many
more such questions could be raised not only with respect to reserve
clause practices, but also with regard to what would constitute reasonable
238 See note 84 supra.
239 See p. 579 supra.
240 Press release by Rep. Emanuel Celler, Chairman of the House judiciary Committee
and its Antitrust Subcommittee, dated January 30, 1958, explaining H.R. 10378, 85th




player drafts, farm systems, and territorial rights practices, including
restrictions upon broadcasting. Obviously then, if the bill reported out
by the House Antitrust Subcommittee should 'be passed, it would re-
quire a vast ambunt of litigation to decide what practices are reasonable.
Since reference has already been made to the deleterious consequences
which would probably flow from a large amount of litigation in this
field, nothing more need be said about it here.242 Additional reasons will
be given for congressional rejection of this bill.
By enacting this legislation, Congress, in a subtle way, would be
passing back to the judiciary the problem of the extent to which profes-
sional team sports should be exempt from the antitrust laws. This should
not be done. As Congress has held extensive hearings on this subject,
it should be in a better position than the courts to decide what exemp-
tions should be granted these sports. In fact, it is most difficult to
imagine the circumstances under which a court would ever have before
it the multitude of witnesses-the Commissioners of Baseball and Foot-
ball, the Presidents of the National Hockey League and the NBA, club
owners, players, sports authorities, and so on-necessary for it to gain
the comprehensive understanding of professional team sports so essential
for deciding intelligently which practices of this unique industry should
be exempt from antitrust laws.
Finally, Congress should try to make exemptions from laws as specific
as possible in order to avoid placing unnecessary burdens on the already
overloaded federal courts. The bill approved by the House Antitrust
Subcommittee fails to do this. Its language extends an invitation to
litigation.
IV. A LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL
Organized professional team sports should be placed under the anti-
trust laws and simultaneously be given several specific exemptions.
243
These should include, either wholly or in part, the following practices:
the reserve clause, player selection system, and territorial rights includ-
ing certain aspects of broadcasting. In addition, provision should be
made for certain safeguards to protect players and to promote free com-
petition. The ensuing discussion will consider, among other things, the
extent to which immunity should be granted each practice mentioned,
242 See the discussion above on the second alternative which would place team sports
under the antitrust laws.
243 The language of the bill would state that the Sherman Act, 26 Stat: 209 (1890), 15
U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1952); the Clayton Act, 36 Stat. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1952);
the Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 717 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-77 (1952); and
the Robinson-Patman Antidiscrimination Act 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 13a,
13b, 21a (1952) apply to the organized professional team sports of baseball, basketball,
football and hockey. Thereafter, specific exemptions would 'be granted.
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what safeguards should be adopted, and why the farm system should not
be allowed exemption.
There is no doubt that the reserve clause gives clubs in an organiza-
tion 44 continuity in player personnel, and prevents the clubs- from
entering into a mad scramble for each other's players. Both of these
are necessary to maintain some semblance of competitive balance in an
organization of a single league or a group of leagues. However, as stated
earlier, the use of the reserve clause system as a war club dgainst outside
competitors should be taboo.
With these principles in mind, then, if a player continues to play
in one organization, such as the National Basketball Association, the
club which originally signs that player should be able to have a con-
tinual option to renew that player's contract for each season that the
player participates in the NBA, unless the team chooses to assign him
to another club in the league.24 5 However, if the player, at the end of
a season, decides that the next season he wants to play in another basket-
ball league, he should be able to do so without being blacklisted by the
NBA and without the NBA being able to use any other type of coercive
economic method against either the player or the outside league.
Moreover, it is realized that by placing its approval on the reserve
clause, Congress would have to take special care to see that players are
protected. In addition to making it possible for players to join outside
organizations without fear of economic reprisal, other safeguards would
have to be employed. One of the problems with the reserve clause from
the viewpoint of player-management relations is that the club owner
has the upper hand in salary negotiations. This situation should be
equalized by requiring salary disputes to be arbitrated. If a player and
club owner should disagree, each should be able to select an arbitrator
to determine the matter. Should the two arbitrators be unable to resolve
the question, they should be empowered to select a third arbitrator. If
they cannot agree on a third arbitrator, the selection should be made
by the Director of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service. The
decision of a majority of the arbitrators, of course, would be final and
binding on both parties.
244 The term "organization" as used herein means that teams or clubs engaged in pro-
fessional baseball, basketball, hockey, or football are combined or otherwise affiliated in the
form of a league or an association of leagues. The NBA, for example, is an organization
consisting of a single league. The government of organized professional baseball, on the
other hand, is an organization consisting of many leagues.
245 It has been suggested that reserve clauses be limited to a certain number of years.
Some say it should be limited to two years; others claim five years is the right number;
and so on. I rejected the limited reserve clause idea as being highly impractical on the
basis of statements made by a number of experts during the course of the 1957 Congressional




Attempts to organize labor unions, as such, in team sports have
met with nothing but failure.246 Perhaps the reason for this is because
the players, themselves, do not want to have their salaries determined
by collective bargaining. Surely there are so many variations and grada-
tions of skill among professional athletes that their salary negotiations do
not lend themselves to collective bargaining. Be that as it may, organized
baseball, basketball, football, and hockey, each have a players' associa-
tion. Naturally, these associations are not typical labor unions, but they
do try to secure concessions from owners in which all players have a
common interest, such as pension plans, minimum salaries, extra pay-
ment for exhibition games, and so on. Any legislation exempting the
reserve clause from the antitrust laws should make it clear that these
associations, if they so desire, may use collective bargaining or related
techniques to accomplish their objectives.
Exemption should also be granted to the player selection system.
There is no question that this practice has helped a great deal to equal-
ize athletic and business competition in football and basketball. It has
been beneficial to players, owners, and the sports public alike. How-
ever, exemption should be so worded that the player selection system
could not become the means of punishing players for joining outside
organizations, or become a method of excluding outside competition.
Territorial rights, as they relate to the division of geographical areas
among clubs in organized team sports, should also be allowed exemption.
But an organization should not be permitted to use economic sanctions
against a competing organization if the latter should move a club into
the same territory.
With respect to the broadcasting aspects of territorial rights, the big
problem today is television. The path pioneered by Judge Grim in
United States v. National Football League provides an equitable solu-
tion to this question. Any professional team sport organization should be
allowed to prohibit telecasts into the home territory of one of its af-
filiated clubs whenever that team is playing at home. This should give
baseball tremendous help with its minor league dilemma and at the same
time not unduly injure the public interest. The allowance of any re-
strictions upon radio broadcasting, however, would be completely un-
justified.
The farm system, though significant in the operation of baseball and
hockey, can hardly be considered essential to their successful survival.
That practice does not fall into the same category as the reserve clause,
player selection system, and territorial rights. Commissioner Frick, in
246 See House Report 172-77.
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his statement before the House Antitrust Subcommittee, said that terri-
torial rights along with the reserve clause were the "keystones" of or-
ganized baseball.147 He made no such claim in behalf of the farm sys-
tem. Moreover, there was substantial evidence produced in the hearings
in 1951 and again in 1957 against the use of the farm system.24s This
is not to say that the farm system should be held in violation of the anti-
trust laws. On the contrary, there are a number of favorable arguments
to support this practice; and, if ever tested by suit, it may well be up-
held. However, "exemptions from antitrust should not be lightly prof-
ferred,"' 49 and it has not been shown that this practice is such a vital
part of professional team sports as to justify its exclusion from the anti-
trust laws.2 50
The proposed legislation should not apply retroactively. This would
prevent any litigation under the act based on past conduct. Thus, base-
ball would not be held accountable for the acts it committed during the
period of its immunity from the antitrust laws. Furthermore, it would
avoid a possible constitutional law problem. This legislation would
amend the Sherman Act, a criminal statute. If it were retroactive, it
might be argued that the act was an ex post facto law in violation of
Article 1, Section 9 of the Constitution.25'
In summary, then, the proposed legislation would:252
1. Declare the antitrust laws to be applicable to the organized profes-
sional team sports of baseball, basketball, football and hockey, except
as otherwise provided.
2 53
2. Provide that the antitrust laws would not apply to uniform player con-
tracts, which, in effect, allow a club to have a continual, annual option
to renew its contract with a player as long as he plays in the organiza-
tion of which that club is a member. However, in order for an
organization to be entitled to this exemption, it would have to:
A. Provide in its uniform player contract that if any club and player
should disagree on salary, that matter would be submitted to arbi-
tration. The player and club would each be entitled to select one
arbitrator. If the arbitrators were unable to resolve the dispute,
they would be entitled to select a third arbitrator. If they were not
able to agree on the third arbitrator, the selection would be made
by the Director of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service.
247 Hearings on Team Sports, pt. 1, at 168.
248 See, e.g., House Report 179-80, 183, 184, 186-88; Hearings on Team Sports, pt.
2, at 1838-39, 1844.
249 Hearings on Team Sports, pt. 1, at 40.
250 Furthermore, as any antitrust litigation based primarily on the farm system practice
would probably be aimed at the richer dubs, it could hardly be argued that such litigation
would drive weaker clubs into bankruptcy. Therefore, the bankruptcy argument discussed
earlier is of no significance as far as the farm system practice is concerned.
251 See Hearings on Team Sports, pt. 1, at 79.
252 This is not written in the form of a bill. It is a summary of those points which I
think a bill on this subject should contain.
253 See note 243 supra.
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Any decision by a majority of the arbitrators would be binding on
the parties.
B. Provide in its uniform player contract that at the end of any sea-
son a player would be released from his contract if he joined a club
outside the organization of which the signatory club was a member.
C. Expunge from its rules and regulations those provisions under
which it might declare ineligible or otherwise suspend (blacklist)
a player, who after playing out the season, joined a competing
organization.
D.. Remove from its rules and regulations any provisions which might
permit it to employ economic sanctions against an outside com-
petitor.
E. Refrain from blacklisting or using any other economic sanctions
whatsoever against a player, who after playing out any season,
joined the club of an outside organization the following season.
F. Refrain from boycotting or using any other economic sanctions
against outside competitors.
3. Provide that the antitrust laws would not apply to the player selection
system. However, that system could not be used in any way as a device
by one organization to prevent a player from joining an outside or-
ganization if he should choose to do so. Nor could any organization
employ any sanctions whatsoever against a player who should join an
outside organization, or against that outside organization itself.
4. Provide that antitrust laws would not apply to agreements between
leagues and between clubs relating to the rights of the parties to such
agreements to operate within specific geographical areas (territorial
rights). This provision would have no application to radio or television
rights. Moreover, the territorial rights practice could not be used in any
way to restrict an outside organization from moving a club into the same
territory.
5. Provide that any organized team sport could prohibit telecasts into the
home territory of any affiliated club on the day that the club is playing
at home. However, the organization could exercise no restrictions over
radio broadcasting rights.
6. Declare that nothing in the act should be construed to deprive any
players in any sport subject to the act of any right to bargain collec-
tively or to engage in other concerted activities for their mutual aid
or protection.
7. State that the act should not apply retroactively. Also at least a 90 day
period after the act has become effective should be granted to profes-
sional team sports so that they can make the necessary changes in their
practices to comply with the act.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In Radovich v. National Football League the Supreme Court declared
that the protective umbrella of the Federal Baseball and Toolson cases
extended only to baseball. The Court, recognizing the close similarity
between baseball and other professional team sports, realized that its
decision hiight be considered "inconsistent or illogical,"'25 4 but contended
254 352 U.S. at 452.
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that any error or discrimination resulting from its strict application of
stare decisis should be eliminated by legislation and not by court decision.
Thus, the Supreme Court passed to Congress the problem of determining
to what extent, if any, professional team sports should be exempt from
the antitrust laws.
An analysis of this perplexing question has been undertaken in this
paper. On the basis of this study, a proposed solution has been offered
to the problem currently facing Congress. It is believed that this pro-
posal would give professional team sports the protection they need with-
out damaging the public interest. Indeed, it is designed "to protect the
industry and the public alike.))2
55
255 Ibid.
